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: A Reporter's Privilege in Florida

A REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE IN FLORIDA: HAS THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SIXTH AMENDMENT BEEN
RECONCILED?
Honorable Jay B. Rosman*
I. INTRODUCTION
The reporter’s privilege in Florida is examined. At the heart of this
examination is the inherent conflict between two constitutional amendments in the
Bill of Rights—the First Amendment and the Sixth Amendment1—specifically, the
conflict that exists between the freedom of the press and the right to a fair trial.2
The salient question addressed is whether the conflict between the First
Amendment and the Sixth Amendment has been reconciled on the issue of a
reporter’s privilege by Florida courts and the Florida Legislature. The answer to
that question is addressed throughout the paper and more directly during the
paper’s conclusion.
This is both an analytic and empirical study. Analytically, in order to address
this constitutional conflict, it is important to look at the two amendments, to define
a reporter’s privilege, and to consider the history of the privilege. After looking at
the history of the reporter’s privilege, pivotal early Florida Supreme Court cases
dealing with the reporter’s privilege are discussed. Also, section 90.5015 of the
Florida Statutes, enacted in October of 1998, and known as the Journalist’s
Privilege Statute, is examined along with Florida Supreme Court cases and Florida
District Court of Appeals cases, post-legislatively. In addition, federal cases that
have interpreted Florida law in this area are discussed. Finally, there is a brief
discussion of the new media and what affect, if any, it has had on Florida law
regarding this issue.
Empirically, a survey was conducted and the results are discussed. The survey
company was hired to conduct a random phone survey using ten questions to see
whether the public’s attitudes and perceptions regarding this issue are consistent or
________________________
*
Judge Jay B. Rosman presently serves as the Chief Judge of Florida’s Twentieth Judicial Circuit. Judge
Rosman has served as a Circuit Judge since 1992. Prior to the circuit bench, he served as a County Judge for Lee
County from 1986. Judge Rosman has also served as an Associate Judge for the Second District Court of Appeal
on three occasions. Judge Rosman received his B.A. with honors from Hofstra University in 1975, his J.D. from
the University of Akron in 1978, and M.J.S. from the National Judicial College at the University of Nevada in
1994. He presently is a Doctoral candidate in judicial studies. This article is submitted towards completion of his
doctorate. Prior to becoming Chief Judge, Judge Rosman taught Business Law and Criminal Law from 1982–2010
at the University of South Florida in Ft. Myers and at Florida Gulf Coast University in Ft. Myers, Florida.
1.
MATTHEW D. BUNKER, JUSTICE AND THE MEDIA: RECONCILING FAIR TRIALS AND A FREE PRESS 68
(Jennings Bryant et al. eds., 1997).
2.
DOUGLAS S. CAMPBELL, FREE PRESS V. FAIR TRIAL: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS SINCE 1807 1
(1994).
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contrary to the state of the law concerning this issue.3 An additional five questions
were administered inquiring about the gender, race, age, political affiliation, and
education level of the respondents; the results were tabulated to see if any of those
factors impacted the results.4
II. THE RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
A. First Amendment
The First Amendment provides that: “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”5
B. Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.6
III. THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE IN CONTEXT
A constitutional battle exists today between journalists and participants in the
criminal justice system.7 The participants include judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and law enforcement. Central to the battle is the desire of the participants
to seek evidence from members of the media.8 Journalists argue that the First
Amendment protects them from testifying.9 The thrust of the argument is that
testifying undermines the essence of a free press, which is to keep the public
informed.10 A journalist cannot keep the public informed if one is restricted to a
________________________
3.
See Telephone Poll with 600 Florida registered voters, Public Policy Polling (2011) [hereinafter Public
Policy Polling].
4.
Id.
5.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7.
See generally MEDIA STUDIES JOURNAL: COVERING THE COURTS (1998), reprinted in, COVERING THE
COURTS: FREE PRESS, FAIR TRIALS AND JOURNALISTIC PERFORMANCE (Robert Giles & Robert Snyder eds., 1999)
(discussing the conflict that journalists and participants face when balancing free press versus fair trials).
8.
Id. at 120.
9.
Id. at 27.
10.
Id. at 7.
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courtroom. The public also may not view the press as free and objective if
journalists continually become witnesses for litigants.
Moreover, subpoenaing a journalist threatens to transform an independent
press into an investigative arm of the government, the same government that the
press was intended to scrutinize in order to maintain a free and open society.11
Also, by forcing journalists to testify, confidential sources may become reluctant to
speak.12 This would result in the reduction of the “free flow of information to the
public,”13 which would violate the First Amendment.14 Over time, journalists have
argued that a reporter’s privilege should exist through the First Amendment to act
as a shield to prevent journalists from testifying about any information gained as
part of their newsgathering work product.15
However, the criminal justice perspective is viewed from a different
constitutional prism. That perspective is based on the Sixth Amendment. The
participants in the justice system look at evidence that will assist or detract from
the case at hand.16 Who holds the salient information does not matter from this
perspective. The overriding consideration is whether the material probative
evidence will assist a jury, grand jury, or judge in their pursuit.17
Furthermore, safeguarding the First Amendment is not a priority, if even a
consideration at all, in seeking to admit evidence before a judge or jury. 18
However, establishing probable cause or guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is of
prime importance.19 Whether or not a case is proven is the focal point of the
participants in the trial setting.20 Ensuring that criminal defendants obtain a fair
trial is paramount.21 Prosecutors seek to introduce evidence that will assist them in
meeting their high burden to obtain a conviction.22 From this perspective, reporters
are simply another class of individuals who have gained possession of material
evidence in a case, who, like any other citizen of this country, have a duty and an
obligation to testify.23
IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE
In the United States, the roots of the reporter’s privilege can be traced back to
1848.24 The situation involved Congress and a reporter, not the justice system. 25 A
________________________
11.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
12.
Id. at 731.
13.
Id. at 725.
14.
Id. at 725–26.
15.
MEDIA STUDIES JOURNAL, supra note 7, at 7.
16.
Myriad Media, The Criminal Justice System, NATIONAL CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,
http://www.victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crime-victims/the-criminal-justicesystem (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
17.
Id.
18.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 736–38 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
19.
Id. at 686–87 (majority opinion).
20.
Id.
21.
Id. at 685.
22.
Id. at 739–40 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
23.
Id. at 685 (majority opinion).
24.
STEPHEN BATES, THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE, THEN AND NOW 2 (2000).
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journalist from the New York Herald, John Nugent, refused to testify before
Congress.26 Congress wanted Nugent to reveal who gave him a copy of a proposed
secret treaty with Mexico.27 (Evidently, “leaks” are not a recent phenomenon.).
When Nugent refused to testify, Congress found him in contempt and sentenced
Nugent to jail:28 a punishment against journalists that continues to this day. 29
Nugent relied on the reporter’s privilege in the First Amendment when refusing to
testify.30 However, Congress recognized no such privilege.31 When Nugent
attempted to have the federal court intercede, the judge deferred to Congress and
found no basis to intervene.32 Arguably, the federal court did not recognize a
reporter’s privilege at that time. The Senate released Nugent after it became
apparent that he was not going to testify.33
In the 1800s, American treatises recognized certain privileges from the
common law, specifically, the attorney-client privilege and the husband-wife
privilege.34 Interestingly, at that time the doctor-patient privilege and the clergypenitent privilege had not gained academic acceptance.35 Later in time, the courts
began to accept the doctor-patient privilege and the clergy-penitent privilege.36
This gave hope to journalists that their claim to a reporter’s privilege would
ultimately be recognized.37
Throughout the early 1900s, journalists refused to testify.38 The refusal was
based on the belief that testifying would have a “chilling effect” on their sources of
news.39 Journalists argued that without such sources, newspapers would no longer
exist.40 One argument made by a reporter was that by breaching the promise of
confidentiality, the reporter could lose an important property right—his job.41
However, courts continually refused to recognize the existence of any reporter’s
privilege under the First Amendment.42 The courts’ position was that reporters

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally Paying the Price: A Recent Census of Reporters Jailed or Fined for Refusing to Testify,
REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/jailed-journalists (last visited
November 18, 2013) (illustrating that journalists are still being found in contempt and sentenced to jail when
refusing to testify in recent cases).
30.
See Daniel Scardino, Vanessa Leggett Serves Maximum Jail Time, First Amendment-Based Reporter’s
Privilege Under Seige, FINDLAW (March 26, 2008), http://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/vanessaleggett-serves-maximum-jail-time-first-amendment-based.html.
31.
Id.
32.
BATES, supra note 24, at 2.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
BATES, supra note 24, at 2.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
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were citizens, no different from any other citizen who had relevant information
concerning the particular proceeding at hand.43
Initially, legislatures were not any more sympathetic to journalists than the
courts.44 While the earliest shield law was passed in Maryland in 1896,45 it was not
until the 1930s and the 1940s that additional states passed shield legislation.46
A. Garland v. Torre
In fact, the first time a First Amendment privilege case reached a federal
appeals court was in 1958, in the case of Garland v. Torre.47 The Garland case
involved the famous entertainer Judy Garland.48 In 1957, CBS and Garland were
trying to schedule television specials together.49 However, they were unable to
agree on the times and format for the programs.50 Marie Torre, a columnist for the
New York Herald Tribune, quoted an unnamed source from CBS who told Torre
that Garland was unable to come to terms with CBS because she was troubled. 51
The source believed that Garland was troubled because Garland, herself, believed
that she was “terribly fat.”52
Garland was offended by the remarks printed in the newspaper and sued CBS
for libel and breach of contract in the amount of 1.4 million dollars.53 When
questioned by Garland’s lawyers, Torre refused to reveal the source of her
information.54 Torre argued that no one would talk to her again if she revealed the
confidential source.55 Torre’s attorney, retained by the New York Herald Tribune,
argued that the First Amendment created a reporter-source privilege that shielded
Torre from disclosing the source of her information.56
The federal appellate court declined to recognize the reporter’s privilege, even
though the court noted the importance of a vibrant First Amendment and its role in
a free society.57 However, the ruling clearly stated that the freedom contained
within the First Amendment was not absolute.58 More importantly, the court noted
that a person’s First Amendment right is almost always impinged upon when a
person is asked to testify.59 Moreover, the court found no specific protection to
________________________
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
BATES, supra note 24, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
BATES, supra note 24, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
BATES, supra note 24, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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refuse to testify in a court setting within the strict construction of the Constitution
based upon the grounds asserted.60
Ultimately, between the two constitutional provisions, the court continued the
tradition of recognizing the need for testimony in a Sixth Amendment setting of a
trial, irrespective of the source of the information.61 In the First Amendment
context, the court found no specific guarantee of a reporter’s privilege in the plain
language of the Constitution, and that a reporter had to testify just like any other
citizen.62
In the Garland case, Torre was incarcerated for ten days for refusing to
testify.63 However, she received a great deal of publicity and journalistic support
for her decision not to testify.64 Torre proclaimed that she did not regret her
decision not to testify; in fact, she thought it may have been her greatest
opportunity in advancing her career.65 In the end, the court neither gained the
testimony it sought from the reporter, nor did the contemnor express any remorse
for her decision.66
B. Landmark Decision: Branzburg v. Hayes
In the 1960s and 1970s, it was the government that sought information from
reporters.67 Prosecutors issued subpoenas to force journalists to disclose
confidential sources before grand juries.68 Notably, three such journalists refused to
testify.69 One was Earl Caldwell of the New York Times, who began covering the
Black Panther Organization and compiled notes and tape-recorded conversations of
various members.70 After an article appeared in the New York Times, the FBI
became interested in the information that Caldwell had gathered.71 Caldwell
refused to comply with the production of any of his work product and claimed a
reporter’s privilege in refusing to testify before a federal grand jury.72
Another journalist and television reporter, Paul Pappas, was also covering the
Black Panther movement.73 His coverage in New Bedford, Massachusetts, also
drew the interest of law enforcement.74 When issued a subpoena to testify
concerning what he observed at the Black Panther’s headquarters, Pappas refused
to testify before a state grand jury.75
________________________
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

BATES, supra note 24, at 3.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See BATES, supra note 24, at 3.
See id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
BATES, supra note 24, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The third journalist, Paul Branzburg, was a reporter with the Louisville
Courier-Journal.76 Unlike the other two journalists, Branzburg was not covering
the Black Panther movement.77 Branzburg’s investigation focused on drug dealers
and drug users.78 His articles were based upon his observations and information
from confidential sources.79 After being subpoenaed by the state grand jury,
Branzburg refused to testify and also refused to reveal his confidential sources. 80
As with the other two reporters, Branzburg asserted a First Amendment reporter’s
privilege not to testify.81
All three cases, which involved grand jury subpoenas of reporters, were
merged into the landmark First Amendment case, Branzburg v. Hayes, which was
decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1972.82 In a five-to-four decision,
Justice White wrote the majority opinion.83 The majority succinctly addressed and
responded to the issue before it as follows:
Until now the only testimonial privilege for unofficial witnesses
that is rooted in the Federal Constitution is the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. We are asked to
create another by interpreting the First Amendment to grant
newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy.
This we decline to do.84
The United States Supreme Court rejected the existence of a reporter’s
privilege.85 While the majority gave initial recognition to the importance of the
First Amendment, Justice White’s opinion did not believe that the courts were
impinging on any rights by requiring grand jury testimony of a reporter.86 Justice
White maintained “these cases involve no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no
prior restraint or restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or
implied command that the press publish what it prefers to withhold.”87
Furthermore, the majority found no impact on the First Amendment in
requiring journalists to testify and no “chilling effect” on the gathering or
publishing of information necessary for a free press.88 Nor did the Court find that
revealing confidential sources had a negative effect on newsgathering if journalists
were forced to disclose their confidential sources.89
________________________
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
BATES, supra note 24, at 5.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667–68 (1972).
Id. at 668.
Id. at 679–80.
BATES, supra note 24, at 5.
Id.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 689–90.
Id. at 709.
See id. at 682–83.
Id. at 681.
BATES, supra note 24, at 5.
Id.
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The Branzburg majority noted the historical importance of the grand jury and
the need for information to be given to that body.90 In reviewing the common law,
the Court found no precedent for a reporter’s privilege.91 Moreover, the Court
found no specific mention of a constitutional privilege affording a reporter a right
not to testify in the First Amendment or the Bill of Rights.92 The Court, as earlier
stated, only recognized the specific federal privilege not to testify that is set out in
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.93
The Court also looked at the First Amendment and the criminal justice system,
specifically noting that First Amendment rights were required to give way to grand
jury proceedings and criminal trials.94 The Court looked at the role of a reporter
and a common citizen, and did not distinguish the two.95 In the Court’s eyes, both
had the duty to testify before a grand jury and in a criminal trial.96
Interestingly, the majority wrote that state legislatures were free to consider the
issue of a reporter’s privilege and had the power to address the issue differently, in
light of their respective state constitutions.97 The only protection for journalists that
the majority recognized was from a bad faith grand jury investigation.98 The Court
warned that harassment of a reporter without any good faith basis would find
protection under the First Amendment.99
An important facet of the Branzburg decision was the concurring opinion
written by Justice Powell.100 Justice Powell agreed with the majority that reporters
were not without some constitutional protection.101 While not specifically
recognizing a privilege, Justice Powell noted that the Court was sympathetic to the
First Amendment and would not allow the media to become an arm of the
government.102 He also stated that journalists should be free from harassment.103
Not only was the reporter protected from a bad faith investigation, but according to
Justice Powell, the reporter would be protected from an investigation that sought
information that was remote and tenuous.104 If a journalist asserted such
harassment, Justice Powell suggested that a motion to quash the subpoena should
be brought.105 Furthermore, Justice Powell maintained that such an assertion should
be addressed on a case-by-case basis, by use of the balancing test approach.106
Justice Powell surmised that a judge must consider the balance between freedom of
________________________
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 685.
Id.
Id. at 689–90.
Id.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 697.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 697.
Id. at 706.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 707–08.
Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 709–10.
Id. at 710.
Id.
Id.

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol19/iss1/4

8

: A Reporter's Privilege in Florida

Fall 2013

A Reporter's Privilege in Florida

101

the press and the duty of a citizen to provide testimony about criminal conduct.107
In short, Justice Powell stated that the courts were “available” to journalists if there
is a First Amendment violation.108 He was unable, however, to take the next step
and recognize a constitutional privilege for reporters based in the First
Amendment.
In the eight months following Branzburg, thirty-five reporters were called to
testify and refused.109 They were found in contempt of court and dozens of
journalists were jailed as a result.110 Journalists continued to seek relief at the state
and federal level.111 At the time of the Branzburg decision, seventeen states had
shield laws.112 Today, a review of state statutes revealed that thirty-one states and
the District of Columbia113 have shield laws. Hawaii repealed their reporter’s
privilege statute on June 30, 2013.114
After Branzburg, media lawyers argued to lower courts that Justice Powell’s
concurring opinion together with the dissenting four Justices created a qualified
reporter’s privilege, even though the majority opinion rejected a qualified
reporter’s privilege.115 Courts at the state and federal level in both civil and
criminal cases accepted the proposition that a qualified reporter’s privilege
existed.116 Many of the courts that acknowledged the existence of a qualified
reporter’s privilege applied a three-prong test.117 The test required the following:
(1) relevant evidence; (2) a compelling need for information that the witness
possesses; and (3) no alternative means of obtaining the information.118 Unless the
test was satisfied, courts post-Branzburg were quashing subpoenas issued to
journalists.119 This three-prong test was the test enunciated by the Branzburg
dissent and rejected by the majority.120
The United States Supreme Court has not receded from the Branzburg majority
opinion. However, it is interesting to note that approximately forty years since its
decision, the Court has declined to hear another case involving the reporter’s
privilege, even when lower courts have recognized a privilege and applied the
three-prong test before requiring a journalist to testify. 121 As to how the Supreme
Court would rule if presented with a reporter’s privilege issue again remains an
open academic question.

________________________
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
BATES, supra note 24, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
H.R. 622, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2013).
BATES, supra note 24, at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
BATES, supra note 24, at 7.
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V. EARLIEST FLORIDA SUPREME COURT CASES
A. Morgan v. State
The origin of the reporter’s privilege in Florida can be traced back to a 1976
case involving a reporter named Lucy Morgan, in which the Florida Supreme Court
recognized a reporter’s limited or conditional First Amendment privilege. 122 The
court’s analysis was based on the Justices’ interpretation of the Branzburg
decision.123
Morgan, a reporter for the Pasco Times, a Florida newspaper, was covering a
story about public officials being investigated for corruption in Dade City. 124
County and city officials were being investigated by a grand jury.125 On November
1, 1973, Morgan, utilizing a confidential source, wrote an article that summarized
the grand jury’s sealed presentment. Morgan stated that the presentment was
critical of various public officials and agencies.126
The state attorney, who presented the corruption case to the grand jury, was
displeased with the article written by Morgan.127 The prosecutor sought to find out
the source of the information by questioning Morgan.128 She refused to disclose the
confidential source to the state attorney.129 Within twelve hours of publication of
the article, Morgan was convicted of contempt and sentenced to serve five months
in jail.130
Before the Second District Court of Appeals reversed the first conviction,
Morgan was convicted a second time for contempt when a grand jury was
convened to address the issue of her disclosing a secret presentment.131 When
asked to reveal the source of her information concerning the presentment, Morgan
again refused to answer.132 She was then sentenced to serve a ninety-day
sentence.133 The appellate court affirmed the second conviction and sentence.134
The court distinguished the two convictions by finding that the first contempt
proceeding was brought improperly by the prosecutor on his own behalf, while the
second contempt proceeding was properly brought before a grand jury.135
Previous to the Morgan case, in 1950, the Florida Supreme Court had rejected
the contention that reporters had any privilege to refuse to disclose confidential
sources.136 That was the last time the Florida Supreme Court addressed the
________________________
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976).
See id.
Id. at 952.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 952.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 953 (citing Morgan v. State, 325 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)).
Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 952–53 (citing Morgan, 325 So. 2d at 41).
Id. at 953.
Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117, 120 (Fla. 1950).
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existence of a reporter’s privilege. Branzburg, however, had been decided by the
United States Supreme Court only four years before the Morgan decision.
Therefore, the Florida Supreme Court was mindful of the Branzburg case and
analyzed the Morgan case according to the standards set forth by the United States
Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court wrestled with determining which
standard should be imposed when addressing the existence of a reporter’s
privilege.137
Justice Hatchett wrote the majority opinion.138 Noting initially the importance
of Branzburg, the court stated, “The United States Supreme Court has now
sanctioned the view that the First Amendment affords ‘some protection for seeking
out the news.’”139 The court also distinguished the majority opinion, as well as the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Branzburg.140 Justice White’s majority
opinion was acknowledged; however, it was noted that the majority did not find a
privilege for journalists to refuse to testify about crimes they had witnessed.141 The
only protection the Branzburg majority granted was the protection from bad faith
investigations of crime.142
The Florida Supreme Court pointed out that Morgan was factually
distinguishable from Branzburg.143 Morgan had not witnessed a crime; she reported
the general criticism of a presentment from a grand jury that was investigating
public officials.144 The reporters in Branzburg observed crimes that became the
subject of their reporting.145 After making this factual distinction, the Morgan court
turned its analysis to Justice Powell’s concurring opinion and his balancing test.146
The court then took an important analytical step that had been taken by other courts
post-Branzburg and recognized a privilege by combining Justice Powell’s
concurrence with the four dissenting Justices.147 “Although the plurality opinion
rejected even a qualified reportorial privilege in terms, Mr. Justice Powell agreed
with the dissenting justices that a reportorial privilege should be recognized in
some circumstances. . . . The Branzburg dissenting and concurring opinions
recognize news gathering as an essential precondition to dissemination of [the]
news . . . .”148
In taking this important step in recognizing a privilege, the Florida Supreme
Court then applied Justice Powell’s balancing test to determine if Morgan was
privileged to refuse to disclose her confidential source.149 The test that was applied
weighed the freedom of the press versus the obligation of citizens to testify with
________________________
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 953.
Id. at 951.
Id. at 953 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
Id. at 954.
Id. (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 692).
Id.
Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954.
Id.
Id. at 953 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 701).
Id. at 954 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring)).
Id.
Id.
Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring)).
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relevant evidence.150 The only interest the government sought to advance in
Morgan was the “preservation of secrecy in grand jury proceedings.”151 In this
case, the court failed to find a legitimate governmental interest that outweighed
First Amendment rights.152
We cannot accept the view that a generalized interest in secrecy of
governmental operations should take precedence over the interest
in assuring public access to information that comes to the press
from confidential informants. . . . The “preservation of the rule of
secrecy” in which some government activity has traditionally been
enshrouded, is not the specific, substantial governmental interest
necessary to defeat a reportorial source privilege.153
In closing, the Morgan court returned to the Branzburg majority opinion and
noted that the prosecutor in Morgan had brought contempt proceedings against the
reporter solely to force her to disclose a confidential source.154 The state attorney
was not interested in seeking evidence concerning an independent crime that the
journalist had observed.155 Nor was the prosecutor seeking testimony that was
necessary to obtain an indictment or a conviction.156 The prosecution was solely
based on the goal of forcing the disclosure of the grand juror who was “leaking”
information to a reporter.157 In conclusion, the Morgan court found that the
government could not even meet the standard set out by the Branzburg majority, in
that the prosecution could not even show that they were proceeding with a good
faith grand jury investigation.158 The court indirectly scolded the government’s
prosecution of Morgan by stating, “The present case falls squarely within this
language in the Branzburg plurality opinion: ‘Official harassment of the press
undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter’s
relationship with his news sources would have no justification.’”159
The analysis of the Branzburg majority was a response to the sole dissent in
Morgan. The Morgan majority, while adopting Justice Powell’s balancing test, as
well as the position that Justice Powell’s concurrence combined with the minority,
created a reporter’s privilege, and addressed the Branzburg plurality decision head
on.160 The Morgan majority pointed out to the Morgan dissent that the state
government could not even satisfy the bad faith Branzburg standard.161
________________________
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 955.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 956.
Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 956.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707–08 (1972)).
Id. at 954.
Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954.
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There was a concurring opinion in Morgan written by Justice Sundberg.162
Justice Sundberg generally agreed with the majority and construed the opinion to
mean that the court had embraced a limited or conditional reporter’s privilege.163 In
a footnote, Justice Sundberg interpreted Branzburg as providing a privilege
through Justice Powell’s concurring opinion combined with the four dissenting
Justices.164 While Justice Sundberg expressed his approval of the balancing test as
set forth in Branzburg, which was adopted in Morgan, he also expressed approval
of the three-prong test as set forth in the Branzburg dissent.165
Returning to the facts of the Morgan case, Justice Sundberg maintained that
Morgan was convicted of a crime with evidence that was not supported by the
record.166 The thrust of his position was that the statute that was alleged to have
been violated proscribed grand jurors from disclosing their deliberations or their
vote.167 This was not the case with Morgan. Morgan did not violate the statute,
according to the concurrence, because she was not a grand juror.168 The statute
speaks to the person “leaking” information, not to the person who reports or
publishes the information.169
The sole dissent was from Justice Overton.170 He expressed concern that the
Morgan ruling promoted the disclosure of secret information from a grand jury. 171
Justice Overton maintained that the majority decision would allow grand jurors,
prosecutors, and court reporters the ability to “leak” (a term he used) information
with immunity.172 Such a consequence would diminish the integrity of the grand
jury, according to Justice Overton.173 While expressing support for Justice Powell’s
opinion in Branzburg, Justice Overton very briefly distinguished Justice Powell’s
concurrence by stating that the facts in Morgan were not the same as in the case at
bar.174
While Justice Overton’s dissent expresses a meritorious concern, it is a tenuous
position. It assumes that the person illegally leaking information will never be
discovered other than by forcing journalists to disclose their sources. As with any
criminal investigation, law enforcement is capable of discovering who committed a
criminal act without solely relying on reporters to prove its case. Punishing the
“leaker” would prevent the disclosure of secret grand jury evidence, as opposed to
punishing the journalist for publishing information to the public under the First
Amendment.175
________________________
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 956 (Sundberg, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 957 (citing Morgan v. State, 325 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)).
Id.
Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 958.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Overton, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 958–59.
Id. at 959.
Id. at 958–59.
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Morgan is an important case in Florida. It was the first Florida Supreme Court
case to recognize any reporter’s privilege up to that point.176 It was also the first
Florida Supreme Court case to analyze the Branzburg decision from the United
States Supreme Court. The Morgan court found merit in Justice Powell’s
concurrence and adopted a balancing test when confronted with the issue of
applying the reporter’s privilege to a journalist who refused to disclose a
confidential source.177 Florida followed the trend that was occurring throughout the
country—to find a reporter’s privilege in the Branzburg concurring opinion
combined with its dissent.178
B. Tribute Company v. Huffstetler
In 1986, ten years after deciding the Morgan case, the Florida Supreme Court
was again faced with the issue of a reporter’s privilege arising out of a journalist
being jailed for contempt.179 The case involved a reporter for the Tampa Tribune
named James Tunstall.180 Tunstall co-authored an article in the newspaper stating
that “an influential resident of West Hernando County” had filed an ethics
complaint with the Ethics Commission, which charged two local county
commissioners for misusing their public offices.181 The Commission received the
complaint after the newspaper article had been published.182 The Ethics
Commission dismissed the complaint after finding that the charges were legally
insufficient.183
After the ethics complaint was dismissed, the two county commissioners
named in the ethics complaint filed a complaint with the state attorney’s office
alleging violation of a Florida statute that prohibited disclosure of either an
intended or existing ethics complaint.184 The state attorney’s office conducted an
investigation.185 As part of the investigation, an assistant state attorney subpoenaed
Tunstall to question him as to the source of his article.186 Tunstall’s attorney moved
to quash the subpoena based on the First Amendment.187 The circuit court denied
the motion to quash.188 When asked to reveal his confidential source, Tunstall
refused.189 Judge Huffstetler, the named defendant in the case, found the journalist
to be in contempt of court for refusing to reveal the confidential source.190 The
________________________
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 955.
Id. at 954 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709–10 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring)).
Id.
Tribune Co. v. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1986).
Id.
Id. (quoting Tribune Co. v. Huffstetler, 463 So. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 723.
Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 723.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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court sentenced Tunstall to serve six months in jail.191 The contempt would have
been purged if the reporter agreed to testify.192 An appeal followed that ultimately
reached the Florida Supreme Court in the case of Tribune Company v.
Huffstetler.193
In the analysis in Huffstetler, Justice McDonald, writing for the majority,
initially referred to the court’s ruling in Morgan and reaffirmed its position.194 The
court stated, “We begin our analysis of Tunstall’s privilege claim by noting that we
have previously recognized a qualified reporter’s privilege against the forced
revelation of sources.”195 After reciting the facts of Morgan, the majority then
turned to the Branzburg case.196 The court noted that the Morgan case was based
on the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Branzburg.197 More importantly,
the court expressed its approval of the Powell concurrence and acknowledged that
the Florida Supreme Court “embraced” Justice Powell’s concurrence in Morgan.198
By devoting attention to Morgan and its Branzburg foundation, the Florida
Supreme Court was reaffirming its stance on the existence of a reporter’s privilege,
as well as a balancing test to determine the extent of the privilege.199
The court, in reaffirming the Morgan analysis and balancing test, found the
facts of the Huffstetler case to be analogous.200 The majority utilized the balancing
test and found that there was a private interest in protecting one’s reputation when
looking at the Florida law prohibiting the disclosure of ethics complaints.201 The
court further ruled that this private interest did not outweigh a reporter’s First
Amendment right.202 The freedom of the press prevailed when balanced against a
limited private interest. Tunstall also attacked his conviction by arguing that the
applicable Florida statute dealing with the disclosure of ethics complaints was
unconstitutional.203 The majority found no merit in this argument because Tunstall
had no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute.204 The court ruled
that only a person who is charged criminally under a statute has the ability to
challenge its constitutional sufficiency.205
One brief concurring opinion was written by Justice Overton, the sole dissenter
in Morgan.206 Justice Overton noted that he dissented in Morgan, but found that,
under the facts of the Huffstetler case, he agreed with the majority that the
________________________
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 723.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 722–23.
Id. at 723.
Id.
Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 723.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 724.
Id.
Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 724.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 725 (Overton, J., concurring).
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reporter’s privilege should prevail.207 He noted his approval of Justice Powell’s
balancing test, as well as the Florida Supreme Court’s application of the balancing
test in Huffstetler.208
The case contained one dissent written by Chief Justice Boyd, who was joined
by Justice Shaw.209 The dissent began by acknowledging that many United States
courts of appeals and many Florida appellate courts have been recognizing a
reporter’s privilege to refuse to disclose information, as well as the identity of
confidential sources in civil and criminal proceedings.210 From there, the dissent
departed from the majority by arguing that there was no authority at the state or
federal constitutional level that protected a reporter from refusing to provide
information concerning a crime committed in the journalist’s presence.211
In essence, Chief Justice Boyd distinguished “between a reporter’s receiving
information from a confidential source about the commission of a crime and the
reporter himself witnessing the commission of a crime.” 212 According to the
dissent, in the former scenario, the journalist may or may not be protected by a
privilege.213 A balancing test would determine the application of the privilege.214 In
the latter scenario, the dissent rejected any privilege.215 Chief Justice Boyd
maintained that the reporter who personally observed a crime should be treated no
differently, in that he or she has the same duty to testify as any other citizen who
witnessed a crime.216
The thrust of the Huffstetler dissent was rooted in the Branzburg majority
opinion. Branzburg and the Huffstetler dissent afforded journalists no privilege
when witnessing the commission of a crime.217 Because Tunstall became a witness
to a criminal violation of a Florida law dealing with disclosure of ethics
complaints, Tunstall would have a duty to testify and, in turn, reveal the
confidential source.218 The dissent also, for argument’s sake, maintained that even
under Justice Powell’s balancing test the result would be the same.219 According to
Chief Justice Boyd, the interest in enforcing a criminal statute outweighed a
reporter’s privilege under the First Amendment freedom of the press.220
The Huffstetler case had significance for several reasons. It clearly reaffirmed
the principles of Morgan in recognizing a reporter’s privilege.221 The majority in
Huffstetler spoke in terms of a “qualified” privilege222 compared to the language in
________________________
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id.
Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 725 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 725.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 725.
Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 722–23.
Id. at 723.
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Morgan of a “limited” or “conditional” privilege.223 The majority even gained the
acceptance of a reporter’s privilege from Justice Overton, who ten years previously
in Morgan, had written the sole dissent.224
Huffstetler reaffirmed the existence of a reporter’s privilege and raised the
argument that the court should expand the privilege.225 While the Morgan court
analyzed its decision under both Justice Powell’s concurrence and the majority
opinion in Branzburg, the Huffstetler court embraced Justice Powell’s opinion as
the basis for its decision.226 Furthermore, the Morgan case represented the
protection of a journalist’s confidential sources in a criminal setting, while
Huffstetler expanded the protection of confidential sources to include civil cases.227
C. Miami Herald v. Morejon
In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court was asked again to expand the qualified
reporter’s privilege.228 However, the court declined to expand the privilege any
further than it had under Morgan and Huffstetler.229 The Morejon court decided the
case without a single dissenting justice. While deciding the issue presented before
it, the Morejon case also raised many questions.230 Unlike the Morgan and
Huffstetler cases that preceded it, the Morejon case did not involve a journalist who
had been jailed for refusing to reveal a confidential source.231 Also, unlike the cases
before it, Morejon did not involve a situation where prosecutors sought the
disclosure of a confidential source.232 In Morejon, a defense attorney sought
exculpatory testimony from a journalist who witnessed his client’s arrest.233
The reporter involved in the Morejon case was Miami Herald writer, Joel
Achenbach, who was working on a story for the paper’s Sunday magazine
section—the Miami Herald Sunday Tropic Magazine.234 Achenbach had obtained
permission from the Metro-Dade police to follow officers who were on duty at the
Miami International Airport.235 While on routine patrol, three police officers
conducted a consensual search of Morejon and his traveling companion at a public

________________________
223.
Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 956 (Fla. 1976) (Sundberg, J., concurring).
224.
See Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 725; Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 958–59 (Justice Overton was Chief Justice of
the Florida Supreme Court when the Morgan case was decided. He was unable to get another justice to join with
him in the Morgan dissent.).
225.
Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 722–23, 725 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
226.
Id. at 723; Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954.
227.
Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d at 723.
228.
See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1990).
229.
Id. at 578.
230.
Id. at 577–78.
231.
Id. at 581.
232.
Id.
233.
Id. at 578.
234.
Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 578.
235.
Id.
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concourse at the airport.236 The search revealed four kilos of cocaine.237 After the
search, Morejon and his companion were both arrested.238
Achenbach witnessed the entire event in his newsgathering capacity.239 As the
events transpired, he was five to six feet away and was taking notes about the
search and arrest.240 He later wrote and published an article discussing the airport
search and arrest.241 In writing the article, Achenbach did not rely on any
confidential sources.242 Morejon’s attorney argued that some details of the article
were inconsistent with the officer’s account of the arrest.243
Morejon was formally charged with a crime—trafficking cocaine.244 He pled
not guilty.245 His attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence.246 The basis for
the motion was the allegation that the search was not consensual because Morejon
claimed he was not sufficiently fluent in English to understand his right to refuse to
be searched.247 His attorney also filed a demand, pursuant to Florida law, for
discovery seeking the names of witnesses who had any relevant information about
the offense that was charged.248 The state attorney responded to the discovery
demand and listed the reporter, Achenbach, as an individual who had information
about the case.249 Morejon issued a subpoena requiring Achenbach to appear at a
deposition and to produce documents.250
Achenbach and the Miami Herald filed a motion to quash the subpoena
claiming a qualified privilege not to testify under the First Amendment.251 The trial
court denied the motion to quash.252 The court ordered Achenbach to submit to a
deposition and held that no qualified privilege existed for any observations
Achenbach made during the course of the search and arrest of the defendant,
Morejon.253 The court also found that even if a privilege existed, it would not
outweigh the need for the reporter to testify as to relevant evidence.254
The Miami Herald sought a writ of certiorari seeking review of the case by the
appellate court.255 That court refused to issue a writ.256 The Third District Court of
Appeal held that the reporter’s qualified privilege “has utterly no application to
________________________
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 578.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 578.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 578.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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information learned by a journalist as a result of being an eyewitness to a relevant
event in a subsequent proceeding,” which included the events that transpired in the
search and arrest of Morejon.257 The appellate court allowed for further review of
the issue by certifying the question of the reporter’s privilege under the facts of the
case to the Florida Supreme Court.258
The Florida Supreme Court began its analysis of the Morejon case by first
addressing the Branzburg case.259 Justice McDonald wrote the majority opinion, as
he had in Huffstetler.260 The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the Branzburg
majority opinion and Justice Powell’s concurrence.261 Unlike the Morgan and
Huffstetler cases before it, the Morejon court italicized Justice Powell’s balancing
test for further emphasis.262
The Morejon majority explained that it decided two cases post-Branzburg.263
Importantly, in the first footnote, the majority explained its posture in those two
cases by referencing the concluding remarks of the Branzburg majority opinion.264
In those concluding remarks, the Branzburg majority invited and encouraged state
legislatures and state courts to address the reporter’s privilege as they deemed
appropriate.265 The Florida Supreme Court also noted that the Florida Legislature
had declined to adopt a statutory reporter’s privilege or shield law. 266
Notwithstanding, the court explained that any reporter’s privilege would be based
on the court’s analysis of protections under the United States Constitution and the
Florida Constitution.267 This was an acceptance by the Florida Supreme Court of
the Branzburg majority’s invitation for states to consider the reporter’s privilege
based on state law.268
It is interesting to note that the court in Morejon, for the first time, explained
why the court had adopted Justice Powell’s concurrence rather than following the
strict posture of the Branzburg majority, which the court failed to explain fourteen
years earlier in Morgan or four years earlier in Huffstetler.269 Those courts simply
followed Justice Powell’s concurrence without any rationale for discarding the
Branzburg majority.270 The Court’s explanation was expressed in the first footnote
of the Morejon case.271

________________________
257.
1988)).
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. at 578 (quoting Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Morejon, 529 So. 2d 1204, 1208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 578.
Id.
Id. at 577; Tribune Co. v. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1986).
Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 579.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 579 n.1.
Id. (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972)).
Id.
Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 579 (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 at 702); BUNKER, supra note 1, at 68.
Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 579 n.1 (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706).
Id. at 579–80.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 579 n.1.
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After explaining the court’s alignment with Justice Powell’s concurrence, the
court went through its own analysis in Morgan.272 The court stated it had taken
Justice Powell’s balancing test and applied it in Morgan to recognize, for the first
time, a limited or qualified privilege preventing the disclosure of confidential
sources.273 The court then explained what it did in Huffstetler, noting that it had
applied the same balancing test as it had in Morgan, and ruled in favor of a
qualified reporter’s privilege that protected the reporter from revealing confidential
information.274
In returning to the case at hand, the Morejon court postulated that the first step
in determining whether a reporter must testify at a deposition was based upon a
determination of whether any privilege existed to preclude a reporter from
testifying under the facts of a particular case.275 A court will not apply a balancing
test unless and until there is a finding that a privilege exists.276
The Miami Herald argued that there should be a broad qualified privilege
whenever a journalist was acting in a newsgathering capacity.277 The paper sought
for the Florida Supreme Court to recognize and expand the reporter’s privilege to
not only confidential sources, but also to anything a reporter observed or
gathered.278 The newspaper also encouraged the court to adopt a three-prong test,
instead of Justice Powell’s balancing test.279 Four out of the five state appellate
courts utilized the three-prong test, which was first enunciated in Garland280 and
then asserted in the Branzburg dissent.281 The Miami Herald also argued that
compelling eyewitness testimony would have a chilling effect on the
newsgathering process.282
The court rejected the arguments brought by the Miami Herald and the
reporter.283 It found that no privilege existed when a reporter was a witness to
relevant events.284 A reporter would be required to testify as to those observations
in “a subsequent court proceeding.”285 Because there was no privilege, no
balancing test was necessary, and Morgan and Huffstetler were distinguishable
from the case at issue.286 The court, in finding that no privilege existed, also
declined to address the merits of the three-prong test being utilized by the Florida
appellate courts.287
________________________
272.
Id. at 579–80.
273.
Id.
274.
Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 580.
275.
Id.
276.
Id.
277.
Id.
278.
Id.
279.
Id.
280.
See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 548–50 (2d Cir. 1958).
281.
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 744–47 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
282.
Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 580.
283.
Id.
284.
Id.
285.
See Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577 (The Florida Supreme Court did not distinguish between a civil or
criminal proceeding).
286.
Id.
287.
Id. at 580 n.4.
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The court expressed its support for, and recognized the importance of, a
vigorous and aggressive press.288 The court, however, took the following position:
“[W]e fail to see how compelling a reporter to testify concerning his eyewitness
observations of a relevant event in a criminal proceeding in any way ‘chills’ or
impinges on the newsgathering process.”289 The court went on to say that its ruling
did not hamper newsgathering and would not have the effect of making reporters
reluctant to seek out news.290
The Florida Supreme Court ruled that a reporter is like any other citizen who
has a duty to come forward with relevant evidence.291 The court noted that
“[e]videntiary privileges in litigation are not favored, and . . . must give way in
proper circumstances.”292 While the court recognized that journalists would be
“somewhat inconvenienced,” it found that, as with every other citizen, such
inconvenience would not serve as a basis for being excused from testifying. 293 In
conclusion, the Morejon majority reminded the parties that no authority existed
supporting the proposition that there was a qualified privilege, which precluded
reporters from testifying as to their own eyewitness observations.294 To the
contrary, the court cited authority that showed other courts in the United States had
found there to be no privilege when the journalist personally observed criminal
activity.295
The Morejon case contained one concurring opinion written by Justice
Barkett.296 While Justice Barkett agreed with the conclusion that the reporter was
not shielded to testify under the facts of the case, she was concerned with the
breadth of the majority opinion.297 The concern was that the majority seemed to
find that there was no First Amendment interest recognized when a reporter acts in
a newsgathering capacity.298 Also, Justice Barkett was concerned that there was no
balancing of respective interests utilized by the majority.299 She urged that the
newsgathering process triggered First Amendment considerations because it was
essential to the dissemination of news by the press.300 Justice Barkett noted that the
majority should have concluded that First Amendment rights exist when a reporter
personally eyewitnesses criminal activity.301 She maintained, however, that she

________________________
288.
Id. at 580–81.
289.
Id. at 581.
290.
Id.
291.
Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 581.
292.
Id. at 581.
293.
Id. Evidently, the term “somewhat inconvenienced” is less than being “inconvenienced.” It is
incongruous for the Court to admit to some inconvenience on the one hand but deny that there is impingement “in
any way” to a reporter on the other hand.
294.
Id.
295.
Id. at 581–82.
296.
Id. at 582 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
297.
Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 582 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
298.
Id.
299.
Id.
300.
Id. (citing Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 954 (Fla. 1976)).
301.
Id.
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would balance that interest under the facts of the case and still arrive at the same
result as the majority.302
The Morejon case raises a number of questions. As Justice Barkett opined, the
majority analysis appeared to find that no First Amendment interest is impacted
when a reporter is an eyewitness to a criminal event.303 Because a reporter operates
under the First Amendment freedom of the press, is not the First Amendment
always a consideration when, in a newsgathering capacity, the reporter obtains
information from a confidential source or observes an event as an eyewitness? The
entire court took the position that a reporter was no different from any other
citizen.304 Because every citizen has a duty to testify, the reporter must also testify
when called upon.305 But is the reporter the same as every other citizen? The
reporter claimed protection under the First Amendment right of freedom of the
press.306 The average citizen has no claim to protection under freedom of the
press.307 The average citizen is not a member of the press. The reporter is a member
of the press and works within the rights guaranteed by the freedom of the press
clause within the First Amendment.308 Therefore, a reporter is not the same as
every other citizen.
The majority asserted that the First Amendment is not impacted at all except,
perhaps, “journalists may be somewhat inconvenienced.”309 Did the Florida
Supreme Court give adequate consideration to the impact its decision would have
on the freedom of the press? Being subpoenaed to testify at a grand jury
proceeding, at a deposition, or at a trial is time consuming. The press cannot be free
to publish news if reporters are sitting in a deposition or waiting in a witness room
for extended periods of time. The press is not free if its reporters, who gather news
under the Constitution, are taken away from their newsgathering capacity. The
press is impacted when its journalists become witnesses.
By forcing a reporter to be a participant in the justice system, the First
Amendment is impacted.310 It is impacted not only in terms of time, but also in
terms of objectivity.311 A free press relies on the belief that it is neutral and
objective312—traits that freedom brings to it. By becoming a participant in the
criminal justice system, reporters, and in turn the press, place their objectivity into
question.313 Are they then the arm of the government or the criminal defendant?
Regardless of the answer, an important component of a free press is diminished.
________________________
302.
Id.
303.
Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 582–83 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
304.
Id. at 581 (majority opinion).
305.
Id.
306.
Id. at 578.
307.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
308.
Id.
309.
Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 581.
310.
Id. at 582.
311.
See id. at 581 (Barkett, J., concurring).
312.
Lili Levi, A New Model for Media Criticism: Lessons from the Schiavo Coverage, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV.
665, 729 n.242 (2007).
313.
Josh Sager, How “Neutral” Reporting Is Biased, THE BOSTON OCCUPIER (Aug. 6, 2012),
http://bostonoccupier.com/how-neutral-reporting-is-biased/.
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While Morejon involved a criminal case,314 would the same rule apply in a
civil case? Will journalists be called as witnesses in civil cases such as personal
injury, contracts, tenant evictions, and probate contests? The answer appears to be
yes. The court did not distinguish between a reporter who observes a criminal event
or a civil event.315 The general rule as stated by the Florida Supreme Court is: “We
adhere to the district court’s conclusion that there is no privilege, qualified, limited,
or otherwise, which protects journalists from testifying as to their eyewitness
observations of a relevant event in a subsequent court proceeding.”316 No
distinction is made by the court between a criminal or civil proceeding. 317 If a
reporter is an eyewitness to a relevant event, they become duty-bound to testify in a
subsequent proceeding.318 That subsequent proceeding may be a grand jury, a
deposition, or a trial—whether the matter is criminal or civil.
Is this court, as well as other courts, so focused on Sixth Amendment
considerations that it is unable to consider the First Amendment? Why, as between
the two amendments, should the Sixth Amendment prevail? Is the Sixth
Amendment more important than the First? Should they not equally stand on their
own, providing rights and protections to their respective citizens that our founders
intended to protect? Courts should recognize that the First and Sixth Amendments
have equal value, and should rule accordingly.
Those are just a few of the questions that the Morejon decision raised. The
Florida Supreme Court will address the reporter’s privilege again.319 More
questions will be answered in this area and more questions will be raised as a result
of the dynamics between the First and Sixth Amendments.
D. CBS, Inc. v. Jackson
Less than a year after deciding the Morejon case, the Florida Supreme Court
would once again address the reporter’s privilege in 1991.320 In CBS, Inc. v.
Jackson, the court also faced the demands of a criminal defendant with drug
charges, who was seeking information from a journalist to assist in the defense of
his case.321 However, the CBS, Inc. case involved a television journalist instead of a
print reporter.322 The court saw no distinction between the two professions, nor did
the court extend a reporter’s privilege in this case.323
Jackson was a defendant arrested by police for the charge of possession of
cocaine.324 Law enforcement was conducting a drug enforcement operation that a
________________________
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

See Morejon, 561 So. 2d at 578 (Barkett, J., concurring).
See id. at 577–82.
Id. at 580.
Id.
Id.
See CBS, Inc. v. Jackson, 578 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam).
Id.
Id. at 699.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2013

23

Barry Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4

116

Barry Law Review

Vol. 19, No. 1

CBS news team was videotaping.325 CBS videotaped portions of the law
enforcement operation and broadcasted parts of it on television.326 Jackson’s
defense attorney sought portions of the videotapes that pertained to his client,
which were not televised, and were referred to as “outtakes.”327 The defense
wanted to view the outtakes in order to prepare for trial.328
CBS refused to provide the tapes to the defendant.329 It claimed that the
outtakes were protected work product under the reporter’s qualified privilege.330
The trial court found that the privilege was “inapplicable because the information
was not from a confidential source.”331 The trial court also found that if the
qualified privilege applied, the defendant carried the burden to show the need to
disclose the outtakes.332
CBS argued that as journalists operating under the First Amendment, they had
a qualified privilege against the forced disclosure of any information obtained in a
newsgathering capacity.333 CBS maintained that in order to overcome the privilege,
the party seeking the information must satisfy a three-prong test.334 This was the
same three-prong test that was argued in previous cases before the Florida Supreme
Court, which was set forth in the Garland case and the Branzburg dissent, and
adopted and applied by a number of appellate courts post-Branzburg.335
In a per curiam opinion, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the existence of a
qualified privilege in the CBS, Inc. case after briefly analyzing Branzburg,
Morgan, Huffstetler, and its most recent privilege case at the time, Morejon.336 The
court saw no distinction between the Morejon case and the case before it.337 The
majority stated, “[f]rom a [F]irst [A]mendment privilege standpoint, we can
perceive no significant difference in the examination of an electronic recording of
an event and verbal testimony about the event.”338
The analysis was virtually identical to that in Morejon.339 The court found no
implication of confidential sources and no basis for the argument that the First
Amendment was impacted at all by its decision to disclose the videotapes of
Jackson’s arrest.340 The majority found that there was only a minor inconvenience
to the media, not a constitutional impingement.341 The CBS, Inc. court applied no
________________________
325.
CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d at 699.
326.
Id.
327.
Id.
328.
Id.
329.
Id.
330.
Id.
331.
CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d at 699.
332.
Id.
333.
Id.
334.
Id.
335.
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545
(2d Cir. 1958).
336.
CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d at 699–700.
337.
Id. at 700.
338.
Id.
339.
Id.
340.
Id.
341.
Id.
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balancing test because it believed that a qualified privilege did not exist in this
case.342 According to the court, a reporter who observes criminal conduct as an
eyewitness and a television journalist who records observations on videotape were
the same.343
Interestingly, in the majority’s conclusion, the court suggested to CBS that its
time was better spent on the issue of recovering costs.344 “While CBS seeks to
implicate the [F]irst [A]mendment, we think that its concern is more legitimately
directed toward the trouble and expense of having to furnish the video outtakes.” 345
The court then provided the basis for CBS to seek recovery of costs with authority
under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and the inherent authority of the court,
even though this was not the issue before the court.346 While the court was looking
at reimbursable costs, CBS was looking at a more precious cost—the First
Amendment.347
There were also two concurring opinions.348 Justice McDonald concurred in
part and dissented in part.349 He agreed with the majority view that a reporter has
no qualified privilege against disclosing physical evidence of a crime or
observations of a crime.350 Justice McDonald’s dissent was based on the view that
the videotapes were property belonging to CBS, a nonparty. As such, the party
seeking the property has the burden of going forward to prove that the material is
relevant, there is no alternative source, and there is a need for the information.351
The burden was basically a three-prong test.352 Justice McDonald’s concern was
not the First Amendment, but the interruption of any business activity or
interference with work product.353
The other concurring opinion was by Justice Barkett, who agreed with the
result reached by the majority because Morejon was controlling.354 However, she
continued to assert the position she held in Morejon: the First Amendment is
always implicated when journalists are engaged in their newsgathering capacity. 355
Whether evidence is admissible then depends upon the results of the balancing test
in considering the issue of admissibility.356
Morgan and Huffstetler represented an expansion and recognition of First
Amendment rights through a qualified reporter’s privilege.357 The cases that
________________________
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
1976).

CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d at 700.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1991).
Id. at 701 (McDonald, J. and Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. (McDonald, J., concurring in part).
Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting in part).
Id.
CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d at 701.
Id. (Barkett, J., concurring in part).
Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting in part).
Id.
See Tribune Co. v. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1986); Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla.
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followed neither expanded nor recognized First Amendment rights or a qualified
reporter’s privilege within the context of the facts of the cases.358 Morejon and
CBS, Inc. marked an erosion of the qualified reporter’s privilege in Florida.359 The
Florida Supreme Court held there is no protection in the form of a privilege when a
reporter witnessed or recorded a crime; in situations where no privilege is attached,
there is no requirement to conduct the balancing test analysis.360
Justice Barkett’s position in both cases has merit. Her view is that the First
Amendment is implicated whenever a journalist is working in a newsgathering
capacity, and that a balancing test should be applied whenever a journalist has
information that is sought as evidence in a trial proceeding.361 Why should there be
exceptions to the privilege if the journalist is working under the free-press clause
and accumulating information? Granted, the Sixth Amendment has a need for this
information, but the value of the First Amendment should be acknowledged and
respected also. They are co-equal amendments. If there is not going to be an
absolute privilege precluding disclosure of a reporter’s information, then a
balancing test would be better than no test at all.
VI. THE JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE: 1998
In 1998, the Florida Legislature enacted a reporter’s privilege statute, which
became effective in May of that same year.362 Perhaps the legislature’s actions
were a response to the erosion of First Amendment rights, the inconsistent
application of varying standards to the reporter’s privilege, the lack of clarity in
free-press cases, and the continued jailing of journalists in the state.
Some viewed the enactment of the statutory privilege as a victory for the
media, in that the journalist’s privilege finally gained legislative approval.363 The
thought was that legislation would guide judges through the privilege and its
application, and there would be consistency in Florida courts applying the
reporter’s privilege.364
Others would argue that the statutory privilege was a defeat for the media.365
The argument was that the First Amendment is a constitutional protection for the
press against governmental interference and that the First Amendment neither
permits nor needs a legislative privilege among common law privileges.366 The
________________________
358.
See CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d 698; Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1990).
359.
See CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d 698; Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577.
360.
See CBS, Inc., 578 So. 2d 698.
361.
See id.; Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577.
362.
FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998).
363.
See generally Sanford L. Bohrer & Susan H. Aprill, Reporter’s Qualified Privilege, FLORIDA BAR,
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/PI/RHandbook01.nsf/1119bd38ae090a748525676f0053b606/e8a24671dbdb7
fdb852569cb004cab2f!OpenDocument (updated Sept. 2007) (discussing the judicial and legislative history behind
Florida’s journalist privilege, and the enactment of section 90.5015 of the Florida Statutes).
364.
Id.
365.
See generally Kurt Wimmer & Stephen Kiehl, Who Owns the Journalist’s Privilege—the Journalist or
the Source?, 28 COMMS. LAW. 9 (August 2011) (“Lowering the bar for when a journalist will disclose confidential
information could redound to the detriment of an entire news organization or, if it happened often enough, the
industry itself.”).
366.
Id. at 12 n.53.
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statute itself could be interpreted as an impingement on the Constitution.367 Also, in
terms of its strength as a privilege, it could be considered weak.368
Irrespective of the varying views on the merits of the legislation, the statutory
reporter’s privilege gained legislative approval.369 Whether there should be a
statutory privilege of a constitutional protection is a valid theoretical question. The
pragmatic answer to the question is that, based on decided cases, the need for the
journalist’s privilege became evident. The statute is set out in its entirety below.
VII. THE JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE: FLORIDA STATUTE SECTION 90.5015
(1) Definitions: For purposes of this section, the term:
(a) “Professional journalist” means a person regularly engaged in
collecting, photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting, or
publishing news, for gain or livelihood, who obtained the
information sought while working as a salaried employee of, or
independent contractor for, a newspaper, news journal, news
agency, press association, wire service, radio or television station,
network, or news magazine. Book authors and others who are not
professional journalists, as defined in this paragraph, are not
included in the provisions of this section.
(b) “News” means information of public concern relating to local,
statewide, national, or worldwide issues or events.
(2) Privilege: A professional journalist has a qualified privilege
not to be a witness concerning, and not to disclose the information,
including the identity of any source, that the professional journalist
has obtained while actively gathering news. This privilege applies
only to information or eyewitness observations obtained within the
normal scope of employment and does not apply to physical
evidence, eyewitness observations, or visual or audio recording of
crimes. A party seeking to overcome this privilege must make a
clear and specific showing that:
(a) The information is relevant and material to unresolved issues
that have been raised in the proceeding for which the information
is sought;
________________________
367.
See John K. Edwards, Should There Be Journalist’s Privilege Against Newsgathering Liability?,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
http://apps.americanbar.org/forums/communication/comlawyer/spring00/edwards.html (last visited Nov. 29,
2013).
368.
See generally Holli Hartman, The Erosion of the Reporter’s Privilege, THE SOC’Y OF PROF.
JOURNALISTS (Sept. 1997), available at https://www.spj.org/pdf/pkr1997.pdf (discussing the weaknesses and
“erosion” of the journalist’s privilege).
369.
Bohrer & Aprill, supra note 363.
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(b) The information cannot be obtained from alternative sources;
and
(c) A compelling interest exists for requiring disclosure of the
information.
(3) Disclosure: A court shall order disclosure pursuant to
subsection (2) only of that portion of the information for which the
showing under subsection (2) has been made and shall support
such order with clear and specific findings made after a hearing.
(4) Waiver: A professional journalist does not waive the privilege
by publishing or broadcasting information.
(5) Construction: This section must not be construed to limit any
privilege or right provided to a professional journalist under law.
(6) Authentication: Photographs, diagrams, video recordings,
audio recordings, computer records, or other business records
maintained, disclosed, provided, or produced by a professional
journalist, or by the employer or principal of a professional
journalist, may be authenticated for admission in evidence upon a
showing, by affidavit of the professional journalist, or other
individual with personal knowledge, that the photograph, diagram,
video recording, audio recording, computer record, or other
business record is a true and accurate copy of the original, and that
the copy truly and accurately reflects the observations and facts
contained therein.
(7) Accuracy of evidence: If the affidavit of authenticity and
accuracy, or other relevant factual circumstance, causes the court
to have clear and convincing doubts as to the authenticity or
accuracy of the proffered evidence, the court may decline to admit
such evidence.
(8) Severability: If any provision of this section or its application
to any particular person or circumstance is held invalid, that
provision or its application is severable and does not affect the
validity of other provisions or applications of this section.370

________________________
370.

FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998).
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A. Florida Statute Section 90.501 in Relation to Section 90.5015
Florida recognizes a number of privileges.371 Section 90.501 allows a person
asserting a privilege to refuse to be a witness, refuse to disclose any matter, refuse
to produce any object or writing, or prevent another from doing any of the
aforementioned.372 While privileges have been based in the common law and the
federal and state constitutions, the Florida Evidence Code enacted by the
legislature acknowledges these privileges.373 Privileges in Florida no longer look to
the judiciary for creation and their existence.374
Statutes in Florida provide that privileges that are defined by the legislature, as
well as federal and state constitutions, will be honored.375 Importantly, the Florida
Evidence Code recognizes privileges that the legislature has approved to protect
interests or relationships that it deems worthy of protection.376 The impact of these
privileges, including the journalist’s privilege, is to sacrifice facts in the
administration of justice because the interest protected is important to society.377
The essence of what is protected is the communication that takes place in a
recognized privileged relationship.378 In Florida, these relationships include, but are
not limited to, the lawyer-client privilege, the husband-wife privilege, the
accountant-client privilege, the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the clergypenitent privilege, and the focus of this paper, the journalist’s privilege. 379 In May
of 1998, the journalist’s privilege, as set out in Florida Statute section 90.5015,
joined the other privileges in the Florida Evidence Code.380
B. Florida Statute Section 90.5015(1): Who May Assert Privilege?
Before providing who may assert the journalist’s privilege, the legislature
defined who that person may be.381 The Code announces that the journalist who
may assert the privilege is a “professional journalist.”382 The section then defines
who is a professional journalist.383 To qualify as a “professional journalist,” the
person must be regularly engaged in gathering or publishing news for some form of
the print media, radio, or television.384 Importantly, the person involved in the
newsgathering or publishing capacity must be doing so for gain or livelihood. 385
The newsgatherer must be a salaried employee or independent contractor for one of
________________________
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

See §§ 90.5015–.5055
§ 90.5015(2).
CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE 285 (2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
EHRHARDT, supra note 373, at 285.
FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998).
§ 90.5015(1)(a).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the news agencies listed.386 The section then explicitly states who is not a
professional journalist, thereby, being incapable of exerting the privilege.387 Book
authors, who are not professional journalists, are listed and are, therefore, excluded
from asserting the privilege.388
The definition section of the statute raises a number of questions. While the
legislature addressed conventional newsgathering forums such as newspapers,
radio, and television, the legislature did not address whether the Internet is included
or excluded from the definition of a professional journalist.389 More specifically,
may a person who gathers and publishes news over the Internet qualify as a
professional journalist? May an internet reporter assert the journalist’s privilege?
The answer should be yes. While its form may be different, the Internet serves the
present day function of the newspaper, the radio, and the television in terms of
informing people of the news.390 The form should not matter. The key requirements
should be the gathering and publishing of news; the Internet satisfies this
requirement.391
An additional question is what is meant by gain? Must a court look at the
adequacy of consideration similar to a contract analysis? In contract disputes,
courts will look at the issue of legal sufficiency rather than whether the
consideration is adequate.392 Must the gain only be in United States currency?
Would anything of value be a gain? Since the statute used the term “gain,”
arguably anything of value would be legally sufficient.393
Would a reporter for a school newspaper qualify as a professional reporter?
While a student may claim that he or she is a newsgatherer, the issue of gain comes
into play. There is no monetary incentive. On the other hand, if college credit is
being applied or experience is considered, then this may be considered a type of
gain. The student must still pass the hurdle of being a salaried employee or an
independent contractor for the news agency. Because a student acts as a
newsgatherer, obtains credit or experience as a gain, and has a relationship with the
school newspaper, it could be argued that a student may satisfy the requirements of
the statute.
The relationship with a news agency is important. Another question is whether
a freelance journalist falls within the definition of this section. If the freelance
journalist has a relationship with a news entity mentioned in the statute, then
arguably he or she would qualify as an independent contractor for the news agency.
If there is no formal relationship established prior to the newsgathering, then the
________________________
386.
Id.
387.
§ 90.5015(1)(a).
388.
Id.
389.
§ 90.5015.
390.
Pew Research Center, In Changing News Landscape, Even Television Is Vulnerable: Trends in News
Consumption: 1991–2012, PEW RESEARCH: CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (Sept. 27, 2012),
http://www.people-press.org/2012/09/27/in-changing-news-landscape-even-television-is-vulnerable/.
391.
See generally id. (discussing the transformation of news platforms from traditional print newspaper to
the internet).
392.
ROGER LEROY MILLER & GAYLORD A. JENTZ, FUNDAMENTALS OF BUSINESS LAW: EXCERPTED CASES
186 (2d ed. 2010).
393.
§ 90.5015(1)(a) (1998).
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analysis becomes more problematic. While the argument may be made that a
freelance journalist receives a gain or livelihood, the statute speaks specifically of
either a salaried employee or an independent contractor for the news agency. The
relationship, apparently, must be established first for the privilege to be asserted.
Also, may a book author qualify under the statute if he or she is also a reporter
for a news agency? The Code speaks only about a book author who is not a
professional journalist.394 Arguably, a book author who has a relationship at the
same time with the news media and is working in a journalistic capacity would be
able to assert the privilege. On the other hand, if an author had no relationship with
a news agency, then there would be no privilege because the author would not meet
the definition of a professional journalist under this section.
C. Florida Statute Section 90.5015(2): When Privilege May Be Asserted
The legislature has clearly stated that the journalist’s privilege is not
absolute.395 It is a qualified privilege.396 The privilege attaches to a defined
journalist who is gathering news information while in a reporter capacity.397 The
privilege would shield the reporter from being a witness and would shield the
reporter from having to disclose information.398 Most importantly, this section
provides protection to not only confidential sources, but also non-confidential
sources.399 The statute settles the issue of confidentiality or non-confidentiality
faced by Florida courts.
The privilege is qualified because even when the privilege applies, it still may
be overcome. If there is a sufficient policy interest that outweighs the privilege, a
reporter will have to testify and disclose information, which then requires applying
the three-prong test set out in the statute.400 The three-prong test is based on the
dissent from Branzburg and has been adopted by a large number of courts postBranzburg.401
The State v. Davis decision from the Florida Supreme Court added another
burden or prong upon a trial court’s application of the balancing test.402 In
determining the compelling need of a criminal defendant, the trial court must factor
into the equation the federal and Florida constitutional rights to compulsory and
due process to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.403 This added
requirement, or fourth prong, is not set out by the legislature in the journalist’s
privilege statute.404
________________________
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

Id.
§ 90.5015(2).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972).
State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 227 (Fla. 1998).
Id.
§ 90.5015(2).
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The standard to overcome the privilege is a clear and specific showing that
appears to be more than a preponderance standard, yet, less than a reasonable doubt
standard.405 It seems to be compatible with a clear and convincing standard.
Specifically excluded from the privilege are matters noted in Florida cases. The
privilege does not apply to physical evidence, eyewitness observations, or
recordings of crimes.406 This is consistent with previous rulings made by the
Florida Supreme Court.407
D. Florida Statute Section 90.5015(4): Waiver of Privilege
This section provides that a waiver of the privilege does not occur when there
is publication or broadcasting of the information.408 This section recognizes that a
newsgathering entity is going to publish or disseminate information in the normal
course of its business capacity.409 If the information is disseminated in the normal
course of the media process, then a waiver of the privilege cannot be claimed
against the reporter or news agency that asserts the privilege.410 Because the statute
is silent as to other situations, a waiver may occur when not precluded by this
section.411
E. Florida Statute Section 90.5015(6): Authentication
This section allows authentication of evidence such as, photographs,
recordings, and records by an affidavit from a professional journalist who has
knowledge of the evidence that is being sought to be admitted.412 As an
accommodation to journalists, this procedure would allow for the admission of
documentary evidence without the need for the particular journalist to wait to
testify or to testify in court. Perhaps this is a legislative recognition of the
newsgathering process under the First Amendment. Rather than waiting in court to
authenticate a document, the journalist can continue his work without interference
under these circumstances.
VIII. LATER FLORIDA SUPREME COURT CASES
A. State v. Davis
May of 1998 was an important year for the reporter’s privilege in Florida. The
legislature enacted the state’s first shield law.413 On October 22, 1998, the Florida
________________________
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.

Davis, 720 So. 2d at 227.
Id.
Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577, 581–82 (Fla. 1990).
§ 90.5015(4).
Id.
See infra Ulrich v. Coast Dental Serv., 739 So. 2d 142, 144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
See infra News Journal Corp. v. Carson, 741 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
§ 90.5015(6).
§ 90.5015.
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Supreme Court decided three cases dealing with the reporter’s privilege.414 The
court would do so without basing their decisions on the new Florida statute. The
first case decided was State v. Davis.415 The facts of the first case preceded the
passage of the journalist’s statute, according to the Davis decision.416 It was not
referenced in the other two.
Merlan Davis was a man who had a relationship with a woman named Nicole
Terry.417 She saw the error of her ways and terminated the relationship in January
of 1990.418 Davis did not understand the concept of terminating a relationship and
continued to pursue Terry.419 His pursuit was unwelcomed.420 Davis’ behavior
became hostile.421 He repeatedly called and threatened Terry.422 He left a message
on her answering machine that he was going to kill her.423 Davis also had
threatened to kill a police officer who had gone to Terry’s home and answered her
phone.424 In May of 1991, Terry obtained an injunction that prevented future
contact.425 Davis paid little attention to the injunctive order.426 On several
occasions, Davis continued to follow and harass Terry.427 One day, he followed her
in his vehicle and cut her off while she was driving, almost causing an accident.428
In December of 1991, an incident occurred that gave rise to criminal charges
against Davis.429 While driving over the Skyway Bridge, Terry saw Davis close
behind her in his vehicle.430 He was beeping his horn and waving a gun out of the
window.431 Terry tried to elude Davis by driving fast.432 A reckless pursuit ensued
and ended when Davis’ car slammed into the rear of Terry’s car.433 She had tapped
her brakes lightly hoping he would back off, but he was traveling so close behind
her that she could not see his headlights.434 Terry lost control of her vehicle and
smashed into cement dividers.435 Davis maintained that, because Terry applied the
brakes, she intended to cause the accident, not Davis.436 He argued her conduct
________________________
414.
State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 220 (Fla. 1998). See infra Kidwell v. State, 730 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1998);
see infra Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. Frangie 720 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1998).
415.
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 220.
416.
Id. at 224.
417.
Id. at 222.
418.
Id.
419.
Id.
420.
Id.
421.
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 222.
422.
Id. at 229.
423.
Id.
424.
Id.
425.
Id. at 222.
426.
Id.
427.
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 229.
428.
Id.
429.
Id. at 222.
430.
Id.
431.
Id. at 229.
432.
Id.
433.
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 222.
434.
Id. at 229.
435.
Id.
436.
Id. at 222.
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negated proof of any specific intent to cause her harm. 437 Davis was charged and
convicted at trial of aggravated assault with a motor vehicle.438
Diane Mason was a reporter with the St. Petersburg Times. She wrote an article
on domestic violence and featured the events and accident involving Davis and
Terry.439 Mason interviewed Terry for the article and discussed the events
surrounding the accident.440 After reading the article, Davis’ attorney wanted to
depose the journalist prior to trial about any statements the victim made to her
about the case.441 The newspaper would not cooperate with the defense attorney.442
As a result, he filed a motion for a subpoena duces tecum.443 A hearing was held on
the motion before the trial judge.444
The attorney for the newspaper argued that the Second District Court of
Appeal had ruled in this area and had adopted a three-prong test for determining
when a reporter is privileged from testifying.445 The appellate court required the
three-prong test for any proceeding, civil or criminal, when information was sought
from a reporter, whether the information was from a confidential or nonconfidential source.446 The trial court applied the three-prong test and ruled that
Davis did not carry his burden for disclosure because he failed to show that the
information was unavailable from an alternative source.447 Not only had the victim
admitted to the braking, but she also told another witness this same information.448
On appeal, the Second District rejected its previous position based on the
Florida Supreme Court’s recent rulings in the Morejon and the CBS, Inc. cases.449
The appellate court interpreted those cases to limit the privilege to confidential
sources only.450 As a result, the appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial
judge.451 The Second District Court of Appeals certified the issue in the form of a
question to the Florida Supreme Court.452
The Florida Supreme Court answered the question at the beginning of its
ruling.453 The majority opinion in Davis was written by Justice Overton, the same
justice who issued the sole dissent in Morgan.454 The Davis court found that the
reporter’s qualified privilege in Florida applied in situations involving both
confidential and non-confidential sources.455 However, the court immediately
________________________
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.

Id. at 229.
Id. at 220.
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 222.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 222.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 223.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 223.
Id. at 220–21.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 221. See Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 958 (Fla. 1976).
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 222.
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cautioned in its opinion that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and due process
rights must be considered when determining whether to preclude disclosure of
information.456
After addressing the facts of the case, the Florida Supreme Court discussed the
history of the reporter’s privilege starting with Branzburg.457 The court reviewed
the majority opinion, Justice Powell’s concurrence, and the dissent in Branzburg;
then the court conducted its own analysis of the privilege starting with Morgan and
Huffstetler.458 The court noted that it had adopted Justice Powell’s concurrence in
those two cases.459 It also acknowledged that those two cases involved the qualified
reporter’s privilege in the context of confidential information sought by the
government.460
The court then reviewed its decisions in Morejon and CBS, Inc.461 It noted that
in those two cases, the information sought was by the defendant in a criminal
context that involved eyewitness observations and the visual recording of a
crime.462 The court stated again the position that no privilege, whatsoever, attaches
in the situation where the journalist is an eyewitness to an event.463 Moreover,
when a defendant, as in CBS, Inc., seeks to obtain relevant physical evidence
recorded electronically, there is no privilege.464 The court saw no distinction
between the electronic recordings of the events of a crime and the reporter’s
eyewitness observations.465 The court then capsulized what it had ruled to date on
the journalist’s privilege:
In summary, these cases reflect that this Court has adopted a
qualified reporter’s privilege, at least in those cases involving
confidential information; but we have indicated that, where a
defendant seeks testimony or evidence, no such privilege exists to
excuse reporters from testifying about their eyewitness
observations or from providing physical material relevant to a
crime.466
After presenting the state of the privilege in Florida, the Florida Supreme Court
then turned to the rights of the accused and noted it had not discussed this issue in
either the Morejon or CBS, Inc. cases.467 The court quoted the Sixth Amendment
and referenced the Due Process Clause of the Florida Constitution.468 The court
________________________
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.

Id.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 224–25.
Id. at 225.
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 225.
Id.
Id. at 226.
Id. See CBS, Inc. v. Jackson, 578 So. 2d 698, 700 (Fla. 1991).
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 226.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2013

35

Barry Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4

128

Barry Law Review

Vol. 19, No. 1

next looked at how other states addressed the reporter’s privilege.469 The court
noticed that there was one common theme when looking at how all of the states
dealt with the reporter’s privilege.470 All of the state courts applied some form of
the traditional three-prong test proposed by the Branzburg dissent.471
After reviewing the other state decisions, the Florida Supreme Court set forth
its new standard on the reporter’s privilege and referred to this new standard as a
clarification on the limitations of the qualified reporter’s privilege in Florida.472
The court first explained that a qualified reporter’s privilege existed in Florida to
both confidential and non-confidential information gathered in a journalistic
capacity.473 Second, the court reaffirmed its position in Morejon and CBS, Inc. by
announcing, as it had in the past, “that the privilege does not apply to eyewitness
observations or physical evidence, including recordings, of a crime.”474
The Florida Supreme Court then, for the first time, embraced and adopted the
three-prong test, noting that it was a test being used by an overwhelming majority
of the states.475 While the court embraced the three-prong test, it added an
additional requirement to the test that could be considered either a fourth prong or a
variance of the third prong.476 The variance, or fourth prong, required that the party
seeking disclosure had to show a compelling need for the information.477 The
Florida Supreme Court ruled as follows:
When determining the compelling need of a defendant, however, a
court not only must weigh the concerns expressed by Justice
Powell; it also must factor into the equation the federal and Florida
constitutional rights to compulsory and due process so as to ensure
that the defendant receives a fair trial.478
After enunciating this new standard with a varied third prong or new fourth
prong, the court then addressed and scolded the media.479 “We emphasize that it is
the court and not the reporter or the reporter’s publisher that determines whether
the privilege acts to preclude disclosure.”480 The court then noted that there were
instances in the country when reporters voluntarily testified in serious criminal
cases without the threat of contempt.481

________________________
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.

Id. at 227.
Id.
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 227.
Id. (The court uses the term “clarify”).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 227.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court next noted that the ruling in Davis was compatible with the new
statute passed by the legislature on a journalist’s privilege.482 This was the extent of
the court’s analysis of the new statute that codified a reporter’s privilege. The
Davis court then published section 90.5015 of the Florida Statutes without further
comment.483
The Davis majority returned to the facts of the case before it and acknowledged
a qualified privilege existed in the case.484 The majority emphasized that the
defendant’s liberty was at stake and that the defendant’s interests in a fair trial and
compulsory process were not factored into any balancing test.485 The trial court
failed to consider the defendant’s interests appropriately.486 While this may have
been an error, the court found it to be harmless error in light of the facts in the
case.487 The statements in the newspaper article were consistent with the victim’s
own statements at trial.488 Even if the victim told the reporter that she intentionally
caused the accident, it would not have been sufficient to warrant a new trial.489 The
facts, as they were, were egregious enough to establish the aggravated assault
charge.490 The court found that there was “no reasonable possibility that the error
contributed to the conviction,” and, in conclusion, affirmed the conviction and
sentence.491
Justice Wells wrote the only other opinion, which concurred in part and
dissented in part with the majority.492 Justice Wells concurred with the result of the
majority, the adoption of the three-prong test, and the exceptions to the journalist’s
privilege.493 However, he dissented on the requirement by the majority to factor
into the test the federal and Florida constitutional rights of the accused to
compulsory and due process to ensure a fair trial.494 Justice Wells argued that it
added additional confusion to the balancing test.495 Justice Wells also expressed
concern that this new requirement appeared to be an additional factor or prong
rather than the three-prong test enunciated in the new law, which he supported.496
In conclusion, Davis is a case that fails to give equal value to the First
Amendment. The court did recognize that the reporter’s privilege attached to both
confidential and non-confidential sources, and it also adopted the three-prong
test.497 However, the majority added an additional requirement to the three-prong
________________________
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.

Id. at 227–28.
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 228.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id.
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 230.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Wells, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id.
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 230.
Id.
Id. at 227 (majority opinion).
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test, which placed emphasis on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.498 The
varied three-prong standard in Davis favors invading the journalist’s privilege and
is contrary to the test set out by the legislature. The traditional three-prong test in
the journalist’s privilege statute makes no mention of the additional requirement
presented in the Davis decision.499 Even with the new statute before it, the Davis
court essentially ignored it.
B. Kidwell v. State
Kidwell v. State was the second of the three reporter’s privilege cases that the
Florida Supreme Court ruled on in October of 1998.500 David Kidwell was a
reporter who interviewed a defendant charged with first-degree murder of a
child.501 The interview took place while the defendant was in jail awaiting trial. 502
The defendant also gave a confession to police.503 The prosecution sought to have
Kidwell testify at trial and he was given the option of either testifying or going to
jail.504 Without applying the three-prong test, the Palm Beach circuit judge jailed
the reporter for seventy days.505 A federal judge eventually released Kidwell on a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pending the exhaustion of all appeals.506
The Fourth District Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s contempt
conviction and sentence and ruled that there was no qualified reporter’s privilege
precluding the disclosure of non-confidential information in a criminal
proceeding.507 The appellate court certified the question of the existence of a
privilege when dealing with non-confidential information to the Florida Supreme
Court.508 The court ruled as it had in Davis, and found that there was a privilege for
non-confidential information.509
Justice Overton wrote the decision for the majority in Kidwell.510 While finding
that a privilege existed, the court also emphasized, as it had in Davis, that any
balancing test must be applied with the court according “great weight to a
defendant’s right to due process and compulsory process in evaluating whether the
requested information should be disclosed.”511
The court went on to say that in applying the three-prong test, Kidwell’s
information was relevant.512 Even if the confession was also given to the police, it
did not automatically mean the information was obtainable from an alternative
________________________
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.

Id.
FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(2) (1998).
Kidwell v. State, 730 So. 2d 670, 670 (Fla. 1998).
Id. at 671.
Kidwell v. State, 696 So. 2d 399, 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 407.
Kidwell v. State, 730 So. 2d 670, 671 (Fla. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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source.513 A defendant would still have the opportunity to determine what
specifically was said to each particular witness.514 One way to achieve that goal
would be an in-camera hearing held by the trial judge.515 The judge would
determine if the information was different and determine its importance for
credibility purposes.516 The majority also said to keep in mind that a jury needs to
hear and consider all relevant information at any trial.517 Mistakes are made if a
jury does not have all the information.518 The Kidwell court opined that because the
public has a confession through a reporter’s article, the jury should also have that
information.519 However, the court cautioned that care should be taken so that the
media does not become “an investigative arm of the government.”520
In their conclusion, the majority again stated their position that if a reporter has
direct evidence of a crime, the information is not privileged.521 Evidence of a crime
would include personal observations and physical evidence—including recordings
of a crime.522 The Kidwell court then boldly addressed confessions made to a
reporter, leaving the First Amendment by the way side: “Like an eyewitness
observation, a direct confession to a reporter is direct evidence of a crime that
would not fall within the information protected under the qualified privilege.”523
In essence, the Kidwell court reaffirmed the general proposition that there is a
privilege for non-confidential information.524 When considering whether to allow
such testimony over objection, the trial judge must apply the three-prong test incamera before its admission.525 Yet, in its conclusion, the court unequivocally
stated that a confession is evidence of a crime, which is no different from
eyewitness observations.526 Because it is direct evidence, it falls outside the
protection of a qualified privilege.527 Then, arguably, there is no need for a
balancing test. Eyewitness testimony simply comes into evidence without the need
to perform any balancing test.
Furthermore, if a confession is no different from eyewitness observations, it
makes no sense that the majority, earlier in its opinion, went through the analysis of
the three-pronged test. Either a confession is an exception or it is not. If it is not,
then a balancing test is needed. The decision is inconsistent at best, and is
intellectually faulty at worst. From a First Amendment standpoint, the decision

________________________
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.

Kidwell, 730 So. 2d at 671.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kidwell, 730 So. 2d at 671.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kidwell, 730 So. 2d at 671.
Id.
Id.
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recognizes only the interests of the accused and that of the government, which
seeks to prosecute the crime.
In the only concurring opinion, Justice Wells agreed with the result and relied
upon his opinion in Davis.528 There, he mentioned his concern over the clarity of
the balancing test.529 Justice Wells expressed concern over the issue of factoring in
due process concerns and the compulsory process as part of the test, which he
believed, would add confusion to the exactness of the test.530
Justice Wells then expressed his approval of Judge Klein’s opinion from the
Kidwell appellate court case.531 Judge Klein noted the inconsistency of federal
courts and Florida courts in addressing the issue of, and standards for, nonconfidential sources.532 He also distinguished an eyewitness observation at the time
of the crime from an interview by a reporter a long time after a crime has been
committed.533 Judge Klein then expressed his First Amendment concerns over the
admission of information from non-confidential sources.534 He considered any
request for a reporter’s information to be a significant intrusion into the
newsgathering process.535 Whenever a party seeks the information from a reporter
involving a non-confidential source, Judge Klein believed that party had the burden
of satisfying a three-prong test.536
Although decided in October of 1998, the Kidwell court analyzed a confession
contrary to the journalist’s statute enacted in May of the same year.537 The court
ruled that confessions were direct evidence of a crime and no different from
eyewitness observation of a crime.538 The analysis is intellectually weak. There is a
distinction between observing a crime at the moment it is being committed, and
receiving a statement from a defendant weeks or months after the commission of a
crime. Furthermore, the legislature noted three exceptions to the privilege.539 The
privilege “does not apply to physical evidence, eyewitness observations, or visual
or audio recording of crimes.”540 A confession is not enumerated as an exception to
the privilege in the statute, it is not physical evidence like a gun or a knife, it is not
an observation of a crime during its commission, and it is not a recording of a
crime.
Arguably, confessions are not an exception under the journalist’s privilege
statute. As such, the statute would require a three-prong test be applied to such
information to determine admissibility. The three-prong test is set out in the code
________________________
528.
Id. at 672 (Wells, J., concurring).
529.
State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 230 (Fla. 1998).
530.
Id.
531.
Kidwell, 730 So. 2d. at 672 (Wells, J., concurring). See Kidwell v. State, 696 So. 2d 399, 406–09 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
532.
Kidwell, 696 So. 2d. at 407.
533.
Id. at 407–08.
534.
Id. at 408.
535.
Id.
536.
Id. at 409.
537.
See id.; FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998).
538.
Kidwell, 730 So. 2d at 671.
539.
§ 90.5015(2).
540.
Id.
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and is not the test announced in Davis and Kidwell.541 Justice Overton’s opinion
strains to recognize confessions as an exception to the privilege.542 It is also another
example of the Florida Supreme Court giving priority to Sixth Amendment
interests at the expense of free-press interests under the First Amendment.
C. Morris Communication v. Frangie
The Frangie decision was the last of the three First Amendment cases decided
by the Florida Supreme Court on October 22, 1998.543 The issue that reached the
court was similar to the issue raised in the Davis decision. The Frangie case was a
short opinion, perhaps because the court already addressed the issue in Davis.
In Frangie, a reporter was served a subpoena in a civil, rather than a criminal,
proceeding.544 Morris Communication brought a motion to quash before the trial
court, which the judge denied.545 On appeal, the First District Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s ruling, relying on the rationale of the Second District
Court of Appeals in the Davis decision.546 The First District Court of Appeals ruled
that Florida law did not recognize a privilege for non-confidential sources for
journalists.547 Because Frangie was in the context of a civil proceeding, the First
District Court of Appeals certified the question of the reporter’s privilege in a civil
proceeding to the Florida Supreme Court.548
The Florida Supreme Court addressed the issue in the Frangie case by
immediately quoting its own language in the Davis opinion: “[f]irst, we hold that a
qualified reporter’s privilege exists in Florida and that such a privilege extends to
both confidential and nonconfidential information gathered in the course of a
reporter’s employment.”549 The court then reaffirmed its position that the privilege
did not attach to “eyewitness observations or physical evidence, including
recordings, of a crime.”550 The court found that once the privilege is recognized,
the trial judge must apply the three-prong balancing test.551
In essence, the court ruled that a qualified privilege applied in both criminal
and civil proceedings, and then remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider a
ruling on the motion to quash based on its decision in Davis as set out in
Frangie.552 The court noted that its ruling in Frangie was basically a clarification
of its ruling in Davis, as the latter involved a criminal proceeding while the former
involved a civil proceeding.553
________________________
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.

Id.
Kidwell, 730 So. 2d at 671–72.
Morris Commc’n Corp. v. Frangie, 720 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1998).
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Frangie, 720 So. 2d at 231 (quoting State v. Davis, 692 So. 2d 220, 226 (Fla. 1998)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 231–32.
Id.
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Since the enactment of the journalist’s privilege statute in 1998, the Florida
Supreme Court has not addressed another reporter’s privilege case since Frangie.
We will have to wait until the court rules on a journalist’s privilege case to
determine how the court will apply the statute together with its own body of cases.
While this paper has mainly looked at Florida Supreme Court cases, it will now
address Florida appellate court cases that have dealt with the issue.554 Below is a
brief summary of those appellate cases followed by federal cases interpreting
Florida law.
IX. FLORIDA DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS CASES
A. Ulrich v. Coast Dental Services
In July of 1999, the Fifth District Court of Appeals decided the case of Ulrich
v. Coast Dental Services.555 Ulrich was a television news reporter who was
involved in a broadcast concerning Coast Dental.556 After the television broadcast,
Coast Dental sued former employees for breach of their confidentiality
agreements.557 Ulrich was subpoenaed by Coast Dental to identify the employees
that Ulrich had spoken with concerning the investigative news piece.558 Ulrich
moved to quash the subpoena.559 The trial judge denied the motion to quash and an
appeal to the appellate court followed.560
The Fifth District Court of Appeals began their analysis by citing the reporter’s
privilege statute, recognizing that the statutory privilege applied to both
confidential and non-confidential information.561 The trial court agreed that the
privilege was attached, but found that there was a waiver based on Ulrich’s
disclosure of the information to other parties.562 The issue was whether the
journalist’s privilege was waived by the prepublication disclosure of the
information.563 The appellate court looked at the distinction between the reporter’s
privilege and other privileges that are based on the initial relationship of privacy. 564
The court also considered the First Amendment need to gather news from protected
sources and relied on other state opinions that had ruled on the issue.565 The
conclusion of the Fifth District Court of Appeals was that prepublication disclosure
would not waive the privilege.566
________________________
554.
See, e.g., Ocala Star v. State, 721 So. 2d 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (A motion to quash a subpoena
issued on a reporter was rendered moot after the subpoena had been withdrawn. The reporter privilege statute was
referenced in the decision).
555.
Ulrich v. Coast Dental Servs., 739 So. 2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
556.
Id.
557.
Id.
558.
Id.
559.
Id.
560.
Id.
561.
Ulrich, 739 So. 2d at 143.
562.
Id.
563.
Id.
564.
Id.
565.
Id. at 143–44.
566.
Id. at 144.
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B. News-Journal Corp. v. Carson
In August of 1999, the Fifth District Court of Appeals again addressed the
reporter’s privilege and analyzed the statutory privilege.567 In News-Journal Corp.
v. Carson, the newspaper was sued by Carson for libel.568 Carson was a candidate
for county judge.569 The newspaper attempted to protect from disclosure two
documents—an unemployment compensation form and a job evaluation form—
that were sought in discovery, which were given to the newspaper by Carson.570
The trial court ruled that the privilege did not bar discovery production because
both documents were given to the newspaper by Carson.571 The Fifth District Court
of Appeals cited the new privilege statute and acknowledged that many states had
adopted a journalist’s privilege statute.572 The court noted that the first document
was filed as part of the lawsuit in the public records.573 As a result, the court found
this constituted a waiver under the statute and under the general waiver of privilege
theory analysis.574 The second document, however, was not placed into the court
record.575 Carson argued that the document was discoverable as physical evidence;
therefore, the privilege would not apply.576 The court rejected this position.577 The
appellate court then applied the three-prong test to the disclosure of the second
document.578 The court found a strong public policy consideration in bringing libel
actions.579 Because of the compelling need to meet the high burden in a libel case,
the court decided that the privilege had to give way. 580 The Fifth District Court of
Appeals was concerned that a litigant would be denied his or her day in court if he
or she were denied information necessary to prosecute a defamation case.581
C. State v. Famiglietti
The Third District Court of Appeals looked at the statutory privilege in the case
of State v. Famiglietti, decided in May of 2002.582 However, the specific privilege
that was before the court was not the journalist’s privilege; it was the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.583 The court indirectly addressed the journalist’s
________________________
567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.
573.
574.
575.
576.
577.
578.
579.
580.
581.
582.
583.

News-Journal Corp. v. Carson, 741 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 573–74.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 573–74.
News-Journal Corp., 741 So. 2d at 574.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 575.
Id.
News-Journal Corp., 741 So. 2d at 576.
Id.
Id.
State v. Famiglietti, 817 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 902.
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privilege statute.584 The case was also an interesting contrast and comparison
between a traditional common law privilege recognized by statute and the new
statutory reporter’s privilege in Florida.585
In the Famiglietti case, the defendant was charged with serious acts of
domestic violence and attempted murder for beating his girlfriend nearly to death
with a tire iron.586 The victim was deposed prior to trial.587 She testified at the
deposition that she told her psychiatrist two other men had beaten her in the past.588
She said this to protect her boyfriend, rather than revealing his identity as a
perpetrator of violence.589 The defense then sought to subpoena all of the victim’s
records from her psychiatrist in order to obtain evidence to attack the credibility of
the victim.590 The trial court authorized the issuance of a subpoena, but ruled that it
would determine in-camera what records would be released to the defense.591 The
State appealed the ruling to the Third District Court of Appeals.592
An original three-judge panel agreed that the privileged records could be
ordered after the application of an unspecified balancing test.593 The original panel
ruled, however, that the defense had not made a sufficient showing of a need to
invade the psychotherapist-patient privilege.594 On its own motion, the appellate
court set the case for a rehearing en banc.595 In an eleven-to-three vote, the court
ruled that the Florida Evidence Code prohibited the disclosure of the victim’s
communications to her psychiatrist because the communications were protected by
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.596
The majority maintained that this privilege was absolute, subject to exceptions
that were inapplicable in the case before it.597 The dissent argued that the privilege
was a qualified one that could and should be invaded to assure that the defendant
secures a fair trial.598 The majority of eleven disagreed and ruled that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege was not a qualified privilege subject to a
balancing test.599 The court pointed toward the journalist’s privilege statute and
proclaimed that the legislature knew how to create a qualified privilege.600 They
maintained that the legislature clearly created a qualified reporter’s privilege and
could do so with any of the other privileges recognized by the Florida Evidence
________________________
584.
585.
586.
587.
588.
589.
590.
591.
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.

Id. at 904.
See Famiglietti, 817 So. 2d 901.
Id. at 902.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Famiglietti, 817 So. 2d at 902–03.
Id. at 903.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 908.
Famiglietti, 817 So. 2d at 904.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Code.601 By comparing the language of the two privileges, the majority ruled that
the legislature simply had not created a qualified psychotherapist-patient
privilege.602
In an interesting contrast with the reporter’s privilege, the court looked at the
policy considerations of protecting the psychotherapist-patient privilege.603 The
court found that it was “sound” policy not to invade that privilege.604 It opined that
invading a patient’s privacy would “eviscerate the effectiveness” of the
confidential privilege.605 It shunned the idea that a balancing test had to be applied
to protect a defendant’s fair trial and due process rights.606 The court stated that the
right to confrontation and the right to cross-examination under the Sixth
Amendment did not outweigh the application of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.607 The court further found that “the due process clause does not authorize
the invasion of a generally-accepted testimonial privilege.”608 Such judicial
deference is not articulated when reading Florida cases that address the reporter’s
privilege.
D. TheStreet.com, Inc. v. Carroll
In December of 2009, the Fourth District Court of Appeals granted the
petitioners’ petition for writ of certiorari and quashed the decision of the Fifteenth
Judicial Circuit in the case of TheStreet.com, Inc. v. Carroll.609 The lower court’s
ruling required the petitioners to produce information claimed to be protected
under Florida’s qualified journalist’s privilege and denied petitioners’ motion to
compel the return of documents they claimed were inadvertently provided as part
of discovery.610
TheStreet.com, Inc. is a financial media company, internet website, and
publisher.611 Melissa Ann Davis was the investigative reporter for the company,
and also one of the petitioners. 612 TheStreet.com, Inc. published an article that
included statements about Carroll, characterizing him as an insurance fraud felon, a
con artist, and a troubling character.613 Carroll sued for defamation.614 He served a
request to produce documents in connection with the materials gathered and the
research conducted for preparation of the article.615 Petitioners invoked the Florida
journalist’s privilege among their objections and produced certain documents that
________________________
601.
602.
603.
604.
605.
606.
607.
608.
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.
614.
615.

Id. at 904.
Id.
Famiglietti, 817 So. 2d at 905.
Id.
Id. (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 2 (1996)).
Id. at 906.
Id. at 907.
Id. at 907–08.
TheStreet.com, Inc. v. Carroll, 20 So. 3d 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 948.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
TheStreet.com, Inc., 20 So. 3d at 948.
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they believed were covered by a tentative confidentiality agreement between the
parties.616 However, petitioners also contended that they inadvertently produced
two documents in which they failed to redact the identities of their confidential
sources.617
The trial court held that the Florida journalist’s privilege had been waived by
the actions and pleadings of the petitioners, and ordered the petitioners to produce
un-redacted documents totaling sixty of the 897 pages produced.618 The court also
found that the journalist’s privilege had been used as a sword and a shield by the
petitioners.619
The district court held that certiorari lies to review orders compelling the
production of documents and information claimed to be protected under the
qualified journalist’s privilege in Florida.620 The district court found that the
element of irreparable harm had been demonstrated, and that the trial court
departed from the essential requirement of law when it ordered discovery
notwithstanding petitioners’ assertion of the Florida journalist’s privilege.621 The
district court also stated that the privilege is governed by section 90.5015 of the
Florida Statutes, which expressly provides a “professional journalist” with a
qualified privilege not to disclose the information, including the identity of any
source that was obtained while the reporter was actively gathering news.622
The court disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the petitioners had
asserted the privilege as both a sword and a shield.623 The court found that the
discovery in dispute related to an affirmative defense and that even if the sword
and shield doctrine applied, the proper remedy would have been to dismiss or strike
petitioners’ defenses and to compel the production of the very information claimed
to be privileged.624 The court also rejected the trial court’s suggestion that the
petitioners failed to invoke the privilege unequivocally and at the earliest time.625
The court further found that Carroll had failed to make the clear and specific
showing required to overcome the privilege, and that the trial court failed to make
the required clear and specific findings for such a result.626 Based on these findings,
the court granted the petition and quashed the orders.627

________________________
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 949.
Id.
Id.
TheStreet.com, Inc., 20 So. 3d at 949.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 950.
TheStreet.com, Inc., 20 So. 3d at 950.
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E. WTVJ-NBC 6 v. Shehadeh
In the recent 2011 case of WTVJ-NBC 6 v. Shehadeh,628 the Third District
Court of Appeals granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, quashed the trial
court’s order that granted Shehadeh’s motion to compel, and denied the motion by
WTVJ and Burnside for a protective order.629 WTVJ, a television network affiliate,
and its reporter, Jeff Burnside, sought a writ of certiorari to quash an order
compelling Burnside to appear for a deposition on a limited topic relating to an
earlier news broadcast.630 The broadcast covered a dispute between the City
Counsel of the City of Homestead, Florida and its former City Manager, Mike
Shehadeh.631
The issue presented to the court was whether WTVJ and Burnside were
entitled to a protective order under Florida’s journalist’s privilege statute.632 The
appellate court found that WTVJ and Burnside were entitled to invoke the qualified
privilege, and that Shehadeh did not make a clear and specific showing regarding
two of the three elements identified in section 90.5015 of the Florida Statutes.633 In
the motion to compel, Shehadeh sought the original of a CD diskette containing
text messages, e-mails, and pin messages of employees and officials of the City of
Homestead that was believed to have been turned over to the press.634 Pin messages
are unencrypted text messages sent from one person’s handheld device to another’s
without going through an intermediate server.635 Essentially, Shehadeh wanted to
ask the reporter if the diskette was received through a public records request or if
the information was leaked.636
While the court found that WTVJ and Burnside were entitled to invoke the
privilege, it questioned whether Shehadeh made a clear and specific showing of all
three elements as required to overcome the limited privilege.637 The court found
that while Shehadeh satisfied the first element, he failed to establish the second and
third elements.638 The court stated that Shehadeh had an array of discovery
procedures available to determine whether any of the City of Homestead
commissioners or employees leaked information to Burnside, a professional
journalist, without questioning Burnside.639 The court also found that the record
presented in this case was precisely the kind of scenario in which the assertion of
the privilege should be upheld.640
________________________
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.
634.
635.
636.
637.
638.
639.
640.

WTVJ-NBC 6 v. Shehadeh, 56 So. 3d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
Id. at 105.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 105–06.
WTVJ-NBC 6, 56 So. 3d at 105.
Id. at 106 n.2.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 106.
Id.
Id.
WTVJ-NBC 6, 56 So. 3d at 106.
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X. THE NEW MEDIA
When a reporter’s privilege was created in Florida by statute in 1998, the
traditional media outlets included radio, television, newspapers, and magazines.641
Today, the new media includes most forms of computer-enhanced
communications.642 Most forms have an inherent interactive quality such as blogs,
discussion boards, podcasting, social networking websites, and Wikis.643
Blogging appears to be the predominant form and the fastest growing cultural
oriented segment of the new media.644 This is due in part to the flexibility of the
platform and that it can be maintained by a single individual.645 Conversely, social
networking websites like Facebook, MySpace, and Meetup require a staff of fulltime employees to maintain the sites.646 Therefore, there is not as much variety as
there is among bloggers. Blogging is also an excellent device for current events.647
Many traditional media outlets incorporate blogs in their online offerings in an
effort to remain connected to their readership.648 However, most bloggers are single
authors who are usually not paid to generate content.649
The Media Bloggers Association is trying to unite bloggers.650 They are a
nonpartisan organization dedicated to supporting the development of blogging, or
citizen journalism, as a distinct form of media.651 However, the simple declaration
that bloggers are journalists does not afford them the shield law protection in many
states.652
Most states, including Florida, would not confer the privilege to most bloggers
unless they meet the requirements of the definition of a “professional journalist”
under section 90.5015 of the Florida Statutes.653 Section 90.5015 of the Florida
Statutes requires that, in order to qualify as a “professional journalist,” a person
must be regularly engaged in gathering or publishing the news for some form of
print media, radio or television; they must be doing so for gain or livelihood, and
they must be a salaried employee or independent contractor for one of the news
agencies listed.654 As of yet, there are no cases in Florida that have addressed this
issue.
________________________
641.
See Drew McManus, How to Connect With New Media: Part I, ADAPTISTRATION BLOG (Feb. 1, 2008),
http://www.adaptistration.com/blog/2008/02/01/how-to-connect-with-new-media-part-1/.
642.
Id.
643.
Id.
644.
Id.
645.
Id.
646.
Id.
647.
McManus, supra note 641.
648.
Id.
649.
Id.
650.
See A. Bauer, Blogging on Broken Glass: Why the Proposed Free Flow of Information Act Needs a
Specific Test for Determining When Media Shield Laws Apply to Bloggers, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 747, 754
n.47 (2009).
651.
Id.
652.
Id.
653.
Id. at 747–48.
654.
FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(1) (1998).
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However, in a recent New Jersey case,655 the court ruled against a blogger
finding that she produced no credentials or proof of affiliation with any recognized
news agency, nor had she demonstrated adherence to any standard of professional
responsibility regulating institutional journalism, such as editing, fact-checking, or
disclosure of conflict of interest.656
Furthermore, it is telling that the Florida legislature has not revised the
journalist’s privilege statute since its creation in 1998. Evidently, the legislature
has not felt a need to revise the statute, even with the onslaught of all new
computer-enhanced communications.
XI. FEDERAL COURTS INTERPRET FLORIDA’S JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE
A. McCarty v. Bankers Insurance Company, Inc.
The first federal court case to interpret and apply section 90.5015 of the Florida
Statutes was the case of McCarty v. Bankers Insurance Company, Inc.657 McCarty
sued his former employer, Bankers Insurance Company, Inc., as well as individual
company officers and investigators for defamation and intentional interference with
employment relationships following an illegal wiretapping of his phone.658 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida issued protective
orders permitting the disclosure of confidential materials for discovery, but
reserving privilege claims.659
Lucy Morgan was a reporter and chief of the Times Publishing Company’s
Tallahassee news bureau.660 Morgan had interviewed individuals and obtained
documents concerning the controversy between the Florida Department of
Insurance and Treasurer (DOI), McCarty, and Banker’s Insurance, and had
published a story in The St. Petersburg Times on June 18, 1996.661 McCarty sought
information relevant to his claims through a subpoena for Morgan’s deposition. 662
The Times and Morgan moved for an order to quash the subpoena and asked for a
protective order under the First Amendment privilege.663
Morgan argued that the federal court should apply the federal common law
regarding privileges because the central claim was based on the alleged violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2520.664 In regard to the state claims, Morgan argued that the law of
Florida was “in disarray” with respect to the validity of a journalist’s privilege and,
thus, was in conflict with federal law.665
________________________
655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.
663.
664.
665.

Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 993 A.2d 845 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
Id.
McCarty v. Bankers Ins. Co., 195 F.R.D. 39 (N.D. Fla. 1998).
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id.
McCarty, 195 F.R.D. at 44.
Id.
Id.
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McCarty argued that the federal court should adopt the state law standard
regarding a journalist’s privilege, which requires the journalist to bear the burden
of showing a privilege exists.666 McCarty also argued that no conflict existed
between federal and state law, therefore, the state law standard should apply to
pending state claims for which the discovery was needed.667
However, at the time the federal court considered the case in June of 1998, any
conflict between Florida and federal common law had been resolved by the Florida
legislature by the creation of a statutory journalist’s privilege section 90.5015 of
the Florida Statutes.668 The court determined that application of either the federal
common law standard or the newly announced Florida standard would yield the
same result because the factors of each were virtually indistinguishable.669 In either
case, the burden rested with McCarty, the party seeking to overcome the qualified
privilege, to establish by clear and convincing evidence each of the three factors,
which were considered the three-prong test.670
After considering all of the factors together, the court agreed with The Times
and Morgan that McCarty had failed to overcome his burden by clear and
convincing evidence.671 Specifically, McCarty had failed to show that the
information he sought from Morgan could not be obtained by other sources, like
“press releases to show Bankers’ public statements about him and his alleged
illegal behavior.”672 He could have also used the article itself “to establish the
discrepancies in” the investigator’s stories.673 McCarty did not succeed in showing
a compelling need for Morgan’s testimony; “he [could not] otherwise establish his
entitlement to relief on his asserted claims.”674
The court further surmised that despite McCarty’s showing that the
information sought was relevant to his claims, that “relevancy [was] outweighed by
the other factors” along with “the compelling need to uphold the journalist’s
privilege which is so broadly recognized in the federal common law and the now
applicable Florida statutory provisions of section 90.5015.”675 Based on that
determination, the court granted the motion for a protective order and quashed the
subpoena for Morgan’s deposition.676 The court also ordered that, “[a]bsent prior
approval of [the] [c]ourt and a proper showing entitling a party to waiver of the
journalist’s privilege, no further discovery shall be had . . . with respect to
[Morgan’s] interviews with Bankers officials or with respect to her news gathering
efforts.”677
________________________
666.
667.
668.
669.
670.
671.
672.
673.
674.
675.
676.
677.

Id. at 44–45.
Id.
Id.
McCarty, 195 F.R.D. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id.
Id.
McCarty, 195 F.R.D. at 47.
Id. at 48.
Id.
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B. Green v. Office of the Sheriff’s Office
In 2002, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, in
the case of Green v. Office of the Sheriff’s Office,678 addressed the journalist’s
privilege under Florida case law and section 90.5015 of the Florida Statutes.679
Unlike the McCarty case, both parties agreed that the statute was the relevant
standard.680 “The underlying action [was] for retaliation under Title VII and the
Florida Civil Rights Act.”681 The action was brought by Green, a female police
officer, against the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office.682
“Winston Dean, a local television news reporter, and [his employer,]
Multimedia Holdings Corporation,” moved to quash Green’s subpoena for Dean’s
testimony.683 Green alleged that Dean’s testimony was necessary to support her
allegations of retaliation and was needed to elicit “the identity of the person who
prompted [Dean] to prepare and broadcast” “a story about incompetent police
officers featuring [Green] as an example of such.”684
After addressing whether the “reporter possess[ed] relevant information;
[whether] the information [could] be obtained from alternative sources; and
[whether] there exist[ed] a compelling interest for requiring the reporter to disclose
the information,” the court granted the motion to quash the subpoena.685 The court
found that Green “failed to take advantage of all reasonable means to determine the
identity of [the] individual.”686 Green “did not pursue the obvious vehicle of an
interrogatory[,]” whereby, the defendant would have had “the burden of conducting
[an] inquiry to determine whether one of its agents [contacted] Dean.”687 Therefore,
because Green had failed to establish the second element, she failed to meet her
burden.688
C. Smoliak v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.
In another Northern District of Florida case, Smoliak v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc.,689 the journalist’s privilege was before the court after a magistrate judge
denied a motion to quash a subpoena.690 Greyhound sought information from Jeff
Burlew, a professional reporter, who had observed Smoliak at a tailgate “party
________________________
678.
4, 2002).
679.
680.
681.
682.
683.
684.
685.
686.
687.
688.
689.
2005).
690.

Green v. Office of the Sheriff’s Office, No. 3:99CV658J21HTS, 2002 WL 32128623 (M.D. Fla. Nov.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Green, 2002 WL 32128623 at *1.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Smoliak v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. 5:04CV245PSPMAK, 2005 WL 3434742 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 17,
Id. at *1.
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before Florida State University’s first home game in 2002.”691 Smoliak sought
“damages for injuries he suffered as a passenger in a bus accident on December 4,
2000.”692 Smoliak “claim[ed] that the accident caused him severe pain that kept
him in bed, [made him] unable to move some days, and forced him to drop out of
pre-med classes.”693
The issue before the court was “whether the reporter’s privilege, codified at
section 90.5015 of the Florida Statutes, protect[ed] Burlew from being a witness
concerning his eyewitness observations of Plaintiff, Scott Smoliak, on matters
relevant to [the] case” and, if so, “whether [Greyhound] made a sufficient showing
to overcome the privilege.”694 In considering whether the privilege applied to
eyewitness observations, the court and the magistrate “relied [on] the Florida
Supreme Court’s opinion in Miami Herald [Publishing] Co. v. Morejon.”695
“In Morejon, the [court] stated ‘that there is no privilege, qualified, limited, or
otherwise, which protects journalists from testifying as to their eyewitness
observations of a relevant event in a subsequent proceeding.’”696 However, the
federal court interpreted Morejon to be limited to criminal matters, because
Morejon was a criminal case and many of the cases cited therein were about
journalists having to testify about criminal activity that the reporters observed. 697
The federal court also relied on the later Florida Supreme Court case of State v.
Davis.698 The court surmised that because this was not a criminal case, the privilege
applied.699 In addition, there was no indication that Burlew had observed Smoliak
committing a crime.700
After examining the other two factors, the court found that Greyhound had not
demonstrated a compelling need that was sufficient to overcome the reporter’s
privilege.701 “[T]he observations at issue represent[ed] just one day in [Smoliak’s]
life,” and Smoliak had “admitted in his deposition that he attended games and
could drink six or seven beers in one episode.”702 Also, Smoliak “did not deny
making the statement” to Burlew nor did he “deny being at the pre-game party.”703
Furthermore, the court found that Greyhound made no attempt to depose “Nick
Crossman or Mark Spiser, who according to [Burlew’s] article were with [Smoliak]
at the pre-game party.”704 Therefore, the court quashed the subpoena issued to
Burlew.705
________________________
691.
692.
693.
694.
695.
696.
697.
698.
699.
700.
701.
702.
703.
704.
705.

Id. at *1–2 (“[T]he parties do not dispute that Jeff Burlew is a ‘professional journalist.’”).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Smoliak, 2005 WL 3434742 at *1.
Id. (citing Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577, 580 (Fla. 1990)).
Id. at *2.
Id. 720 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Smoliak, 2005 WL 3434742 at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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D. United States v. Fountain View Apartments, Inc.
In the most recent case, the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida, the Orlando Division, examined the journalist’s privilege in the case of
the United States v. Fountain View Apartments, Inc.706 However, the federal court
decided that the Florida statute did not apply because the case was “brought under
the Fair Housing Act and jurisdiction [was] based on a federal question.” 707
Therefore, federal law governed the case.708
XII. REVIEW OF FLORIDA’S JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE
The tension between the First Amendment and the Sixth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution continues to exist in Florida. The tension is inherent in the
relationship of these two amendments. The press seeks to gather and publish
information free from any governmental intrusion. The justice system seeks
relevant evidence to ensure fair trials for defendants, plaintiffs, and victims.
The reporter’s privilege in Florida was initially recognized in the Morgan case,
decided in 1976, by the Florida Supreme Court.709 Its creation is based on the
court’s analysis of the Branzburg decision.710 More specifically, the Florida
Supreme Court adopted Justice Powell’s concurring opinion and found the
existence of a qualified reporter’s privilege.711 While the Florida Supreme Court
recognized a journalist’s privilege in both criminal and civil cases, the privilege
was not expansive. Initially, the privilege protected information from only
confidential sources.712 Neither eyewitness observations of a crime nor recordings
of a crime were privileged.713
The Florida Supreme Court eventually adopted a three-prong test in 1998.714
The court attached another requirement, or prong, that weighed the test in favor of
forcing disclosure of information during trial proceedings.715 The court ruled that
when determining a compelling need for information, a trial court must factor into
the test “the federal and Florida constitutional rights to compulsory and due process
so as to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.”716 This additional burden, or
fourth prong, is tantamount to the creation of a presumption that favors the
limitation of the privilege in a criminal setting. The application of the court’s
________________________
706.
United States v. Fountain View Apartments, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-891-Orl-35DAB, 2009 WL 1905046
(M.D. Fla. July 1, 2009).
707.
Id. at *2.
708.
Id.
709.
See Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976).
710.
Id. at 953–54 (analyzing and interpreting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)).
711.
Id. at 954.
712.
Tribune Co. v. Huffstetler, 489 So. 2d 722, 723, 725 (Fla. 1986).
713.
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). As one of the first cases to recognize a reporter’s privilege, the
Court did not make any exceptions to the criminal setting it was confronted with.
714.
State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 227 (Fla. 1998).
715.
Id.
716.
Id.
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balancing test has benefited Sixth Amendment interests at the expense of First
Amendment interests.717
The Florida Supreme Court ruled that confessions are “direct evidence of a
crime” and not protected by any privilege.718 The court also ruled that the qualified
reporter’s privilege applied to both confidential and non-confidential information,
in both criminal and civil cases.719
The Florida Legislature finally addressed the reporter’s privilege in favor of a
qualified privilege. While not as protective as many common law privileges also
recognized by the Florida Evidence Code, the reporter’s privilege had gained
statutory strength. Its strength is limited to the three-prong test, as well as to its
exceptions. “[T]he privilege does not apply to eyewitness observations or physical
evidence, including recordings, of a crime.”720 While the legislature adopted a
three-prong test, the added requirement, or fourth prong, under Davis is still being
applied as a further limitation of the privilege.721 Subsequent to the passage of the
journalist’s privilege by the legislature, only a few appellate courts have addressed
the statute. To date, the Florida Supreme Court has not directly analyzed the new
statute.
XIII. SURVEY OF REGISTERED FLORIDA VOTERS’ ATTITUDES
A. Methodology
The following survey was designed to discover and analyze the attitudes and
perceptions of Florida’s registered voters in order to see if those perceptions and
attitudes are in sync with the law, which provides for a reporter’s privilege.722 The
survey concerns the importance of the First Amendment’s right to a free press
versus the Sixth Amendment’s right to a fair trial.723
The survey was conducted by phone.724 The respondents were from a list
obtained by the surveyor on March 29, 2011, of randomly sampled registered
voters throughout the State of Florida.725 Only phone numbers were used to create a
random and anonymous response.726 The phone numbers were further randomized
by using the RAND function in Microsoft Excel, so that they would not be called
________________________
717.
Id. By adding a fourth prong that favors the limitation of the privilege in a criminal setting, the court
has shown a preference of the Sixth Amendment over the First Amendment.
718.
Kidwell v. State, 730 So. 2d 670, 671 (Fla. 1998).
719.
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 222 (“[W]e answer . . . finding that the qualified reporter’s privilege in Florida
applies to factual situations involving both nonconfidential and confidential information.”); Morris Commc’n
Corp. v. Frangie, 720 So. 2d 230, 231–32 (Fla. 1998) (“[W]e clarify that a qualified reporter’s privilege applies in
both civil and criminal proceedings.”).
720.
Davis, 720 So. 2d at 227.
721.
See Kidwell, 730 So. 2d at 671 (while acknowledging the three-prong test in Davis, the majority agreed
that the fourth prong should also be considered).
722.
Public Policy Polling, supra note 3.
723.
Id.
724.
Id.
725.
Id.
726.
Id.
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in any particular order.727 The RAND function generates a random decimal in cell
B1 with the numbers in Column A.728 The formula is copied and pasted so that
each phone number is associated with a different random decimal.729
The sample started with 30,000 respondents who were dialed up to a maximum
of six times in order to obtain 600 responses.730 When the respondents answered
the phone, they heard the recorded questions and pushed the numbers that
corresponded to the answer choices, and those numbers were recorded.731
B. Procedure
The survey consisted of fifteen questions.732 The respondents could choose the
answers yes, no, or not sure.733 The first three questions were asked to gauge if the
respondents felt that a free press and the right to a fair trial were important, and to
see which one was more important if there was a conflict between the two.734 The
next seven questions focused on the rights of the reporter to protect their sources
and to see in what instances the respondents would support that right.735 The last
five questions focused on demographics, in order to see the makeup of the
respondents, and if factors like gender, race, age, education, and political
affiliations impacted the results.736
C. Results
Of the 600 respondents, 53% were female and 47% were male.737 Forty-one
percent were Democrats, 34% were Republicans, and 25% were
Independents/Other.738 Sixty-eight percent of the respondents were White, 15%
were Hispanic, 12% were African-American, and 6% were marked other.739 Thirtysix percent of the respondents were age 46 to 65, 28% were older than 65, 24%
were 30 to 45 years of age, and 12% were 18 to 29 years old.740 Forty-eight percent
of the respondents had a two or four year degree, 25% had a high school education,
24% had more than a four-year degree, and 4% marked none of the above.741
When asked if they felt that a free press was important, 91% of all respondents
answered yes, 4% said no, and 5% said that they were not sure.742 When asked if
________________________
727.
728.
729.
730.
731.
732.
733.
734.
735.
736.
737.
738.
739.
740.
741.
742.

Id.
Public Policy Polling, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Public Policy Polling, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Public Policy Polling, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
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they felt that a right to a fair trial was important, 96% of the respondents said yes,
3% said no, and 1% said that they were not sure.743 However, when the respondents
were asked which right was more important if a conflict existed between the right
to a free press and the right to a fair trial, 68% of the respondents picked the right
to a fair trial, 13% picked the right to a free press, and 19% said that they were not
sure.744
The most salient results were found in question number three. While 91% of
respondents said that a free press was important and 96% said that the right to a fair
trial was important, when asked to choose which was more important in the face of
a conflict, 68% picked the right to a fair trial and 13% picked a right to a freepress, and those that were not sure rose significantly. 745 Perhaps this is why the
battle to secure a reporter’s privilege under the law has been slow and arduous. In
this instance, the law is in sync with public perception, in that, a right to a fair trial
is paramount.
When asked if a reporter should have the right to protect his or her confidential
sources from disclosure, 63% said yes, 24% said no, and 12% said that they were
not sure.746 When asked if they would support a law that allows reporters to protect
their sources, 55% of the respondents said yes, 27% said no, and 18% were not
sure.747 However, when the respondents were asked if a reporter should be required
to reveal a source if the information is needed to ensure a fair trial, 67% of
respondents said yes, 18% said no, and 15% were not sure.748 As in the first
instance, the right to a fair trial trumps a reporter’s rights when a conflict between
the two arises.
The respondents were divided when they were asked if reporters should be
incarcerated if they disobeyed a court order to disclose a confidential source or
information.749 Only 44% of respondents said yes, 39% said no, and 16% were not
sure.750 When asked if they would support a law that protects reporters from
incarceration, 36% said yes, 40% said no, and 24% said that they were not sure.751
The respondents were then asked if a reporter observes a crime being
committed, whether the reporter should be required to testify as to his or her
observances.752 In response to this question, 84% said yes, 8% said no, and 7%
were not sure.753 The numbers were a little lower when respondents were asked if a
reporter hears a witness make statements concerning a crime, whether they think
that reporter should be required to testify about what was heard.754 Seventy-three
________________________
743.
744.
745.
746.
747.
748.
749.
750.
751.
752.
753.
754.

Id.
Id.
Id. (analysis came from comparing the results from questions one, two, and three).
Public Policy Polling, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. (analysis came from observing the results in question seven).
Id.
Id.
Public Policy Polling, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
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percent of respondents answered yes, 16% said no, and 10% were not sure.755
These results are also consistent with the state of the law, which holds that a
reporter must testify if he observes a crime being committed or overhears
statements regarding a crime.756
The data was then cross-tabulated to see what the results would show when
they were tabulated for gender, party affiliation, race, age, and education.757 The
statistics were very close when the respondents were analyzed based on gender. It
appears that males and females answered in a similar way on the majority of the
questions. However, it appears that females answered more often that they were not
sure on questions seven through ten. For example, when asked if there should be a
law to protect reporter’s sources, the results were that 21% of females were not
sure versus 15% males.758 When asked whether reporters should go to jail if they
disobey a court order, 22% of females were not sure versus 10% males.759 And
when asked whether they would support a law protecting reporters for refusing to
disclose a source, 33% of females were not sure versus 14% males.760 Females also
tended to be more supportive of a reporter’s rights in questions four through seven.
When the results were analyzed for party affiliation, the results were also
surprisingly consistent among the respondents. Notably, a significant difference
was seen where democrats were more supportive of a reporter’s rights than their
counterparts.761 This is especially noticeable in questions four through eight.762
Notable in the race categories was that Hispanics and African Americans were
at 75% and 79% respectively concerning question three, when their counterparts
were at 66% and 56% in finding a fair trial more important than a free press. 763
Another deviation was from the subgroup called “Other,” when asked if a reporter
should have to reveal his or her source to ensure a fair trial, that group answered
yes at 82% versus other groups whose answers ranged from 65% through 70%. 764
The “Other” subgroup was also 15% higher on questions nine and ten.765
When analyzed according to age, the eighteen through twenty-nine year olds
deviated from their counterparts concerning questions one, two, three, nine, and
ten.766
The only correlation for education were on questions three, six, seven, and
eight, where it appears that high school and none-of-the-above subgroups voted
similarly on those questions.767
________________________
755.
756.
757.
758.
759.
760.
761.
762.
763.
764.
765.
766.
767.
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Public Policy Polling, supra note 3.
Id.
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Public Policy Polling, supra note 3.
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D. Further Analysis of Survey Results
Surprisingly, the overall survey results were very consistent with the law as it
now stands. While the respondents found that the right to a free press and the right
to a fair trial were equally important, when there was a conflict between the two,
the Sixth Amendment prevailed.768 Also, the answers to questions nine and ten,
whether a reporter should have to testify if he observes a crime or overhears
evidence of a crime, were also very consistent with the law as it now stands.769
Notably, the respondents were split on questions four through eight and were more
ambiguous than in their answers to one, two, three, nine, and ten.770 Perhaps that is
why the courts created a balancing test in those situations. Maybe the respondents
were looking for the middle ground like the courts.
XIV. CONCLUSION
In looking at the reporter’s privilege in Florida, this paper has raised the
question as to whether the conflict between the First Amendment and the Sixth
Amendment has been reconciled. The Florida Supreme Court, through case
decisions, has reconciled the constitutional conflict.771 The Florida Legislature,
through the passage of section 90.5015 of the Florida Statutes, has also reconciled
the debate between the two amendments.772 Both the Florida Supreme Court and
the Florida Legislature have settled the constitutional dispute by adopting a
balancing test to be applied when both amendments are in play within the justice
system.773 Interestingly, the balancing test pronounced by the Florida Supreme
Court is weighted in favor of the Sixth Amendment’s need for evidence over the
interest of a free press in the First Amendment.774 The court’s test is less protective
of the journalist’s privilege than the test set out by the legislature.775
While the Florida Supreme Court and the Florida Legislature have settled the
conflict, the question remains whether the application of a balancing test
appropriately resolves the dispute. The balancing test’s goal is not to reach
equilibrium with amendments on opposite sides of the scale. The test is clearly
from the justice system’s perspective. The perspective is focused on the
admissibility of evidence. Unlike absolute common law privileges recognized in
the Florida Evidence Code, the qualified journalist’s privilege may be overcome

________________________
768.
Id.
769.
Id.
770.
Public Policy Polling, supra note 3.
771.
See Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 954 (Fla. 1976) (the balancing test takes consideration of both
freedom of press and right to a fair trial).
772.
FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(2) (1998) (by including a privilege limitation in criminal cases, the Florida
Legislature has used the balancing test).
773.
Id.; Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954.
774.
Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954 (the balancing test takes consideration of criminal cases and makes
exceptions to the privilege, thus making it favor the Sixth Amendment).
775.
See § 90.5015(2); Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954.
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without great difficulty because of the emphasis placed on the Sixth Amendment
by both the courts and the legislature.776
The balancing test does not give equal value to both amendments. It is a test
that results in the impingement of one amendment in favor of another. The
impingement is upon the First Amendment in favor of rights enumerated in the
Sixth Amendment. No court would consider compromising the Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial. Courts have not been as deferential to or mindful of
compromising free-press rights.777
Likewise, the survey showed that Florida voters also value the right to a fair
trial over the right to a free press.778 The survey showed that respondents highly
and equally valued the right to a free press and the right to a fair trial.779 However,
when a conflict arose between the two, the right to a fair trial was chosen 68% of
the time.780 Perhaps the law is based on common sense in this instance. Is the best
law not based on principles that the common person can understand, value, and
ultimately choose to follow?
Or is a test that would have as its goal a state of equilibrium, one that would
give equal value to both amendments preferable? Giving equal value to both
amendments would not result in the admissibility into evidence of information
gathered and published by reporters. If the First Amendment were viewed as
having equal value to the Sixth Amendment, a court or legislature would not
impinge upon it.781
Many in the media support this view, and it has some support from those in the
judiciary.782 Information from the press under this analysis would be admitted into
court only at the pleasure of the particular news agency or individual journalist. In
the past, journalists have voluntarily testified to confessions made by criminal
defendants in murder cases.783 If the decision to provide testimony were left to
those in the press, then it is likely that voluntary evidence would be provided in
particular cases.
Is one amendment more important than another? Did our founders intend to
apply equal value to the First and Sixth Amendments? Would they applaud or
decry the balancing test being utilized? If one were a strict constructionist, there
would be the argument that all the amendments should have equal value. The
founders did not intend that one amendment be given greater weight than
________________________
776.
See § 90.5015(2); Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954; EHRHARDT, supra note 373.
777.
See generally CBS, Inc. v. Jackson, 578 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1991) (holding that the privilege does not
apply to video recording that were taken during criminal events); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d
577 (Fla. 1990) (holding that no privilege existed when a reporter witnessed an event during a criminal situation
during the scope of a news investigation).
778.
Public Policy Polling, supra note 3.
779.
Id.
780.
Id.
781.
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 712 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
782.
See Latara Appleby, Senate Judiciary Committee Passes a Reporter’s Shield Bill, REPORTERS
COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-lawresources/news/senate-judiciary-committee-passes-reporters-shield-bill. (The Senate Judiciary Committee passed a
federal shield bill for the Senate’s approval that will give reporters a qualified privilege.).
783.
State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 227 (Fla. 1998).
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another.784 Ideally, there should be no interference upon the First Amendment in
favor of another amendment. Academically, one would not favor the Sixth
Amendment above another amendment either.
If the ideal would be to give equal value to the First Amendment, why have
courts and legislatures adopted and applied a balancing test? Perhaps the answer is
that it is a pragmatic compromise between competing interests within the First and
Sixth Amendments. It should be noted that prior to the passage of shield laws,
many judges did not recognize any journalist’s privilege at all, other than from a
bad faith investigation.785 Yet, not recognizing any privilege places very little value
on the First Amendment; considering a journalist to be no different than any other
citizen fails to give any value or deference to free-press rights. While a balancing
test gives greater respect and deference to the First Amendment, it still results in an
impingement upon it. The consequence of balancing, however, is the compromise
of one amendment over another. It sacrifices one in favor of another.
The failure to give equal value to the amendments is based upon individuals,
ultimately judges, who believe that the Sixth Amendment has greater value than
the First Amendment.786 It is an application of the amendments that seeks as its
priority an admirable goal—a fair trial.787 It is a pragmatic good faith application
made by those who operate within the Sixth Amendment as part of the trial
process.788 This creates an understandable, yet natural bias in favor of giving
greater value to the right to a fair trial as compared with a free press. Imagine if the
decision of admitting a journalist’s information were to be made by the media as
opposed to the courts. The perspective would be one that gave great value and
deference to free-press rights in favor of protecting a reporter’s information from
disclosure.
As an academic exercise, it is easy to discuss the optimum application of the
Bill of Rights. The ideal application of equal value to the amendments will often
bring about a practical, but harsh result. In the justice system, a defendant will be
denied exculpatory evidence and the prosecution will be denied material evidence
that impacts the ability to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.789 In civil
cases, similar results will occur.790 If the optimum ideal is not acceptable from a
policy standpoint, the balancing test is a pragmatic approach to resolving conflict
between the First and Sixth Amendments.
On the other hand, other privileges in the evidence code sacrifice admissible
evidence in favor of a societal purpose.791 The consequence of nondisclosure from
________________________
784.
See generally U.S. CONST. art. VI. (Article VI of the Constitution states that the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land. Because it does not state that one article and/or amendment can be more supreme than
another, it follows that all articles and/or amendments are held equal to one another.).
785.
Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 551 (2d Cir. 1958).
786.
See Sandra F. Chance & Susan D. Ross, Gag Orders: Shields or Swords in the Constitutional Conflict
Between Fair Trial and Free Press, 1 COMM. L. & POL’Y 271–97 (1996).
787.
Id.
788.
Id.
789.
See Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of Prosecutorial
Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 391 (1984).
790.
Id. at 412 n.129.
791.
See EHRHARDT, supra note 373.
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those privileges is harsh from a justice system perspective. If a confession were
given within the context of the lawyer-client privilege, the husband-wife privilege,
the psychotherapist-patient privilege, or the clergy-penitent privilege, disclosure of
the statement would not take place.792 The absolute nature of those privileges,
subject to their exceptions, would protect the confidentiality of the information.793
Why then is the journalist’s privilege less important than other privileges? Why are
traditional common law privileges in the evidence code more important than the
reporter’s privilege? The journalist’s privilege is the weakest privilege in the
Florida Evidence Code.794 As a statutory privilege, the journalist’s privilege is the
weakest privilege in terms of precluding disclosure of protected information.795 Its
strength is based on the value that the people of Florida have accorded the press as
compared with other privileged relationships.796
It is interesting to see the deference given to an absolute privilege. The courts
are reluctant to invade a common law privilege, even when faced with Sixth
Amendment interests.797 Yet, the courts have little hesitancy invading the
journalist’s privilege based on the First Amendment of the Constitution in favor of
the Sixth Amendment.798 Evidently, there is support for the principle that the Sixth
Amendment cannot trump a common law privilege, but one amendment, the Sixth
Amendment, may easily trump another amendment, the First Amendment. 799
Theoretically, it should be easier for a constitutional right, such as the Sixth
Amendment, to trump a common law privilege rather than a constitutional
amendment to trump another constitutional amendment.800
The application of a balancing test should take place with equal value being
afforded to both amendments. The test should not be weighted at the outset in favor
of impinging upon the First Amendment. Also, the balancing test should apply to
all information that is requested from a journalist. If a defendant gives multiple
confessions, a balancing test may preclude a journalist from testifying about that
same confession. Yet under Florida case law, a confession has been interpreted as
being direct evidence and, therefore, an exception to the privilege.801
________________________
See The Reporter’s Privilege Compendium: An Introduction, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM
PRESS
(2002),
http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/guides/reportersprivilege/introduction#sthash.j7i5czfU.dpuf [hereinafter, REPORTER’S COMMITTEE].
793.
Id.
794.
EHRHARDT, supra note 373.
795.
Id. (comparing to the common law privileges found in Florida’s Evidence Code).
796.
See generally Public Policy Polling, supra note 3 (showing that the majority of those questioned
believe a fair trial is more important than the freedom of press when they conflict each other).
797.
See generally State v. Famiglietti, 817 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing that a
defendant could not obtain privileged communication between the victim and her psychotherapist even if the
defendant can show a “reasonable probability” that the communication is necessary to his defense).
798.
See Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 954 (Fla. 1976) (discussing the balancing test shows that when
confronted with the fair trial of a defendant, the privilege may not apply).
799.
See REPORTER’S COMMITTEE, supra note 792.
800.
See generally EHRHARDT, supra note 373 at 284–405; U.S. CONST. art. VI. (Article VI of the
Constitution states that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Because a common law privilege cannot be
held higher than the Constitution, it follows that a constitutional right is supreme to a common law privilege.).
801.
Kidwell v. State, 730 So. 2d 670, 671 (Fla. 1998).
792.
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Judges should be educated on the importance of free-press rights. It is critical
to note that the result of any balancing test depends on who is doing the
balancing.802 Many judges have an adversarial perspective when considering First
Amendment issues.803 Even United States Supreme Court Justices are distrustful
and critical of the media.804 Many judges view the media as being very powerful,
critical, and unethical.805 It is an important role of a free press to investigate the
government and to freely publish that information to the public. Many people in the
government, including judges, do not understand nor appreciate the media’s
function, especially when the news story is about that individual.806 This creates an
antagonistic relationship. It is understandable then that the underlying conflict
between a judge and the media would give rise to a conflict between the First and
Sixth Amendment.
In the final analysis, the Florida Supreme Court and the Florida Legislature
have reconciled the competing interests presented by the First and Sixth
Amendments.807 The balancing test is a pragmatic approach to reconciling conflicts
between the amendments. The balancing test, however, results in a compromise
often at the expense of impinging upon free-press rights in favor of the right to a
fair trial.808 The test favors forced disclosure of information from the media. The
test is applied by judges who may, unknowingly and sometimes knowingly, have a
bias in favor of Sixth Amendment rights and against free press rights. With a better
understanding and education on the function of the press, judges will be better able
to apply an objective, unbiased balancing test. Until equal value is placed on the
First and Sixth Amendments, the tension between the two amendments and
between the media and the courts will continue in Florida.

________________________
802.
Chance & Ross, supra note 786.
803.
Id.
804.
See generally S.L. ALEXANDER, COVERING THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR JOURNALIST 68
(University Press of America 1999). (“[J]udges are particularly sensitive to public opinion of their abilities, and
many judges are wary of courtroom cameras which may broadcast every detail of their conduct in a trial for all to
evaluate.”); KEVIN MERIDA & MICHAEL A. FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT: THE DIVIDED SOUL OF CLARENCE
THOMAS (2007). This book was written about Justice Clarence Thomas. He was quoted as describing the media as
“malicious.” He also stated the following to a reporter, “You’ve got some scoundrels in your business. Why do
you have so many scoundrels?” Justice Thomas’s contempt for the media is shared by other judges in the country,
including Justice Scalia.
805.
ALEXANDER, supra note 804.
806.
MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 804.
807.
See generally FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(2) (1998); Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 954 (Fla. 1976) (After
the Supreme Court of Florida held that there should be a proper balance between the First and Sixth Amendments,
legislature enacted section 90.5015(2) of the Florida Statutes which states that a privilege applies to a reporter’s
eyewitness observations obtained during the scope of employment but does not apply to physical evidence,
eyewitness observations, or recordings of a crime.).
808.
See § 90.5015(2); Morgan, 337 So. 2d at 954. The balancing test found in both sources show that when
confronted with the fair trial of a defendant, the privilege may not apply to all situations.
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